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FRAGMENTED BODIES, LEGAL PRIVILEGE, AND
COMMODIFICATION IN SCIENCE AND MEDICINE
We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms:
it 'excludes,' it 'represses,' it 'censors,' it 'abstracts,' it 'masks,' it 'conceals.' In
fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and
rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him
belong to this production.1
-Michel Foucault
"The dream of reason did not take power into account."'2
-Paul Starr
I. INTRODUCTION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND COMMODIFICATION OF THE BODY
Science and medicine have long possessed a culturally distinct status in Ameri-
can society;3 however, in the contemporary context of corporate biotechnology
and managed health care, this cultural authority has begun to appear to many as
increasingly threatening. Science and medicine often are criticized for having
become businesses. This recognition becomes more daunting when one considers
that a primary object of entrepreneurial pursuits in science and medicine is the
commodification of the human body. That is, many scientific and medical prac-
tices effectively reduce the body to an object defined by its exchange value in the
marketplace. 4
Given the rapid advances of medical research and biotechnology, the relation-
ship of American culture to its scientific and medical institutions can be described
as ambiguous at best. For instance, Time recently published a special issue en-
1. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 194 (Alan Sheridan, trans., Vintage Books 2d ed.
1995) (1958).
2. PAUL STARR, THE SocIAL TRANFoRmAON OF AMERICAN MEDICINE: THE RISE OF A SOVEREIGN
PROFESSION AND THE MAKING OF A VAST INDUSTRY 3 (1982).
3. See id. at 4.
4. Commodification has been defined as:
[T]he process of transforming an object, quality, or capacity into something with rec-
ognizable market value.. .occur[ring] in several [different] ways.. .[such as] by wage
labor, by advertising, by commercial exploitation of women's bodies, [and] by
biotechnology's reduction or fragmentation of the body into marketable parts, and by
the conceptual and ideological shift in our society toward thinking of the body as
something marketable or alterable.
Peter Halewood, Law's Bodies: Disembodiment and the Structure of Liberal Property Rights, 81
IOWA L. REv. 1331, 1332-33 (1996). See also M. KrnH BOOKER, A PRAcTICAL ImRODUCON TO
LrERARY THEORY AND CRIICISM 476 (1996) (defining "commodity" as "aspects of the capitalist
economy that are valued not for their use value but for their exchange value," and further ex-
plaining that "[c]ommodities are thus interchangeable and are not valued for any genuine prop-
erties of their own"); Arjun Appadura, Introduction: Commodities and the Politics of Value,
The Social Things of Life, in CO.MoDrrms IN CULTURAL PERsPECTIvE 25 (Arjun Appadurai ed.,
1986) (explaining that "commodities tend to dissolve the links between persons and things" and
that "such a tendency is balanced by a countertendency in all societies to restrict, control, and
channel exchange). For further discussion on the politics of commodities, see id. at 3-63.
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titled, Heroes of Medicine.5 The article characterized the essence of the medical
profession as altruistic:
No matter what other goals it may achieve, the medical profession has always
maintained as its ultimate mission the relief of human suffering. Though the
greatest of medical innovators have made their most important contributions for
any combination of personal and professional reasons, the background against
which their motivations play has never changed. 6
Modem developments in the marketplace call this assumption into doubt. In
Virginia, a former physician attempted to start a kidney-brokering company in
order to collect a commission from selling the kidneys of indigent U.S. and Third
World donors.7 The physician said he got the idea while watching news reports of
the mass deaths in Bangladesh and saw "the waste of all those organs lying there. '8
Reporters in 1994 broke the story of a scandal involving the national health labo-
ratory in France that delayed for seven months the approval of a U.S. AIDS screen-
ing test so that it could develop its own rival product. This delay resulted in the
deaths of over 4000 hemophiliac patients. 9 Further investigations have revealed
the organized harvesting of organs from executed Chinese prisoners as a source of
supply for a world-wide black-market,10 and a prominent New York physician
who markets customized frozen embryos to infertile couples who can afford them. 1
Obviously, many of these accounts exist at the periphery of the medical pro-
fession. 12 Nevertheless, these and other extreme examples reflect our culture's
relationship to its scientific and medical institutions as an ambiguous combination
of veneration, distrust, and dependency. Yet, whether they are venerated as the
figure of altruism and healing (as with the physician) or vilified as a threat to
humanity (as with the newest wave of medical researchers), the cultural legitima-
5. Shurwin B. Nuland, Heroes of Medicine, Tmui, Fall 1997, at 7.
6. Id. at 8.
7. See Margaret Engel, Va. Doctor Plans Company toArrange Sale of Human Kidneys, WA L
Posr, Sept. 19, 1983, at A9.
8. Id. See also Ellen Goodman, Life for Sale, WASH. Posr, Oct. 1, 1983, atAl5 (discussing
the market interest in human organs).
9. See France Weighs New Charges In AIDS Case, CHt. SuN TiNms, Oct. 4, 1995, available in
1995 WL 6673818.
10. See Allison K. Owen, Death Row Inmates or Organ Donors: China's Source of Body
Organs for Medical Transplantation, 5 IND. INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 495, 495 (1995); see also
Christopher Drew, U.S. Says 2 Chinese Offered Organs From the Executed, N.Y. Tzms, Feb. 24,
1998, atA1; Lena H. Sun, China's Executed Convicts Donate Organs Unwittingly, WASh. PosT,
March 27, 1994, at A22.
11. See Gina Kolata, Clinics Selling Embryos Made for "Adoption," N.Y. Teas, Nov. 23,
1997, atAl.
12. Many experts would take issue with the broad term "medical profession" as used to
describe everyone and anyone who gains their cultural legitimacy through science and medi-
cine. There are indeed factions of the medical profession that serve distinct functions: the
physician, the surgeon, the pharmacologist, the medical researcher, and so on. Moreover, sci-
ence has long been considered an entirely separate field apart from medicine.
In creating legal policy and determining property rights in the body, however, lawmakers
traditionally have treated both scientific research and the medical profession as interchangeable
representatives of science itself. Therefore, this Author uses terms such as "medical profession"
and "scientific and medical research" in the broadest sense, albeit generalized, to discuss the
influence of the very institution of science on legal discourse.
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tion of science and medicine continues to set them apart from other institutions in
the realm of legal policy-making. The "invisibilization" of science and medicine's
economic interest in the subjects (or objects) of their research produces a strange
gap in current legal discourse 13 surrounding the advancements of medical research
and biotechnology.
The naturalization of medical and scientific knowledge and power (i.e., the
cultural erasure of their historically politicized origins and economic interests) has
given rise to two problematic assumptions: [1] that the knowledge possessed by
science and medical professionals is without material, historical origin; and [2]
that the ability to interpret "scientific truths" establishes a natural proprietary right
in scientific and medical entrepreneurs.
This Comment examines the laws governing the organ donation process as
well as controversial legal debates over property rights in organs and other body
parts used for medical research, and focuses on the noticeable absence in these
ethical debates of the proper acknowledgment of the medical profession's entre-
preneurial interest in its subjects. It argues that this gap in our legal discourse, the
glossing over of scientific and medical economic interests, has brought about much
of the current anxiety concerning the rapid advances of biotechnology.
This Comment is not intended to dismiss the obvious benefits of medical re-
search or the social utility of the medical profession. As medical historian Paul
Starr has commented, few "suffering from a bad fever or a broken arm, would go
so far to prove a point as to trade a modern physician for a traditional healer." 14
Similarly, this Comment does not attempt to refute the usefulness of scientific and
medical knowledge. Rather, a critique is undertaken of the "discourse of accom-
modation": the way in which particular institutions in our society are automati-
cally valued over others. 15 In other words, this Comment examines the discourse
surrounding the legitimacy of scientific and medical knowledge and argues that
this discourse effectively produces the cultural and social authority of this knowl-
edge.16 Particular emphasis is therefore placed upon the significant effects of the
13. Generally, "discourse" has been defined as "any use of language... [that is] most fre-
quently used to refer to a body of texts or statements that are conditioned by a common set of
assumptions, attitudes, and goals." M. KErI BooKER, A PRACTICAL INTRODUCnoN TO LIRARY
THEORY AND CRITICIsM 477 (1996). See also CHRIS WEEDON, FEMINIST PRACTICE &
POsTSTRUcTuRALisTTHEoRY, 35 (1987) (further explaining discourse as involving "[s]ocial struc-
tures and processes [that] are organized through institutions and practices such as the law, the
political system, the church, the family, the education system and the media, each of which is
located in and structured by a particular discursivefield").
14. STARR, supra note 2, at 4.
15. See Celeste Michelle Condit, Hegemony in a Mass-mediated Society: Concordance about
Reproductive Technologies, 11 CarncAL STUD. IN MASS COMMUN. 211 (1994).
16. "Social authority" has been defined as the ability of a particular institution to regulate
action or give commands based on the "probability that people will obey a command recognized
as legitimate according to the prevailing rules in their society." STARR, supra note 2, at 13.
"Cultural authority," on the other hand, refers to the ways in which particular professional
communities "become sovereign over different aspects of reality," and how their "particular
definitions of reality and judgments of meaning and value will prevail as valid and true." Id.
This cultural authority may be found in such things as scientific treatises, legal opinions, sacred
texts, or books of grammar. See id. Thus, whereas "social" refers to the "control of action" in
the relationships between social actors, "cultural" refers to the "construction of reality through
definitions of fact and value." Id. "Cultural" refers to the production of meaning and ideas that
makes social authority possible. See id.
[Vol. 51:1
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dominant modes of expression surrounding science and medicine, and their im-
pact on medical research and the advancement of biotechnology.
The complexity and elusiveness of both social and cultural authority requires
analysis, not finger-pointing. 17 Our cultural authorities do not gain social promi-
nence through sheer domination and coercion, but through negotiations of mean-
ing among various individuals and collective groups. 18 Thus, those who criticize
this knowledge/power are no less a part of its discursive production than those
who are the objects of their attacks. 19 From this perspective, professions such as
medicine and law, as institutions of knowledge and power (hence, culturally legiti-
mated), produce our sense of ourselves as medical or legal subjects because it is
within our discourse that power is naturalized. Institutions such as science, medi-
cine, and law sustain their power (and their pervasiveness) not only by the way in
which we talk about them, but by the very fact that we talk about them at all. Thus,
historically, the legitimacy of these powerful institutions of knowledge are per-
petually regenerated and sustained through discursive productions of meaning.
Because control of the body is the object of medical knowledge and legal
discourse, the body effectively becomes "one of the factors contributing to knowl-
edge and justice, while it is simultaneously constructed by them."2 0 It is from this
theoretical perspective that this Comment examines the ways in which the cultural
significance of science and medicine affects laws governing commodification of
the body, as well as the impact of this cultural significance on the rapid advances
taking place in science and medicine.
Section Two of this Comment briefly traces the history of the medical profes-
sion, and explains how it has not always enjoyed its current position of cultural
and social distinction. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, physi-
cians struggled to distinguish themselves from the ordinary entrepreneur. Yet,
17. As one commentator explains:
The critic's task is no longer to locate, describe, and delegitimate the voice of asingu-
lar domineering elite. Instead it is to describe the plurivocal nature of public dis-
course and to account for the rise to dominance of particular public vocabularies by
exploring how the texts articulate to the interests of multiple groups.
Condit, supra note 15, at 215.
18. Proponents of this theoretical perspective reject, as critically indefensible, the traditional
theory of ideology, which posits that there exists a uniform and wide-swecping "false conscious-
ness:' Instead, it has been persuasively argued that certain groups and classes gain cultural
legitimacy, and thus social power, through a variety of discourses that also include counter-
discourses of resistance to, and negotiation of, their legitimacy. This negotiation of meaning is
commonly referred to as "hegemony." See JOHN SToR , AN INTRonucroytY GumEs ro CuL2IRAL
THroRY mn PoPuLAR Cunnw, 121 (1993) ("Popular culture is articulated as a structured terrain
of cultural exchange and negotiation ('a compromise equilibrium') between forces of incorpo-
ration and resistance: a struggle between an attempt to universalize the interests of the dominant
against the resistance of the subordinate."). See also RAmo,om Wiats, KMvos, A VocAnu-
LARY oF CuLTuRE Am Socmry, 118 (1983) (describing hegemony as "an integral form of class
rule which exists not only in political and economic institutions and relationships but also in
active forms of experience and consciousness"); Chantal Mouffe, Democratic Citizenship and
the Political Community, in DavuisioNs oFRA cALDsOCRAcv, 234 (Chantal Mouffe cd., 1992)
(explaining the application of hegemony: "Political life concerns collective, public action; it
aims at the construction of a ".we' in a context of diversity and conflict").
19. See MicHEL FoucAuLT, supra note 1, at 194.
20. Halewood, supra note 4, at 1379.
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because American medicine had been a disorganized trade subject to intense com-
mercial rivalry, these new professionals failed to achieve socially legitimate au-
thority or distinction in American culture.2 1 It was not until the early twentieth
century that the previously disjointed American Medical Association (AMA) fi-
nally gained unity among its members by creating an organizational sovereignty.22
Led by the single, collective voice of the AMA, the new medical profession rap-
idly emerged as a distinct cultural authority in American society. This authority
has now served to distinguish the medical figure from the ordinary entrepreneur, a
contrast which accounts for much of the legal deference shown both science and
medicine in general.
Section Three discusses the status of the laws governing organ donation and
medical research and the effect of these laws on the commodification of the body.
It also examines the relative legal deference enjoyed by science and medicine with
respect to this issue. Courts and legislatures have argued that the sanctity of the
body is essential to human dignity and autonomy and thus should not be made an
object of the market, but at the same time they have nevertheless implicitly granted
science and medicine a virtual monopoly over the commercialization of the body.
Consequently, federal and state legislators, as well as judges, have granted privi-
leges to the medical profession not given other groups or individuals. This mo-
nopolistic privilege is notably evident in the National Organ Transplant Act,23 the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act,24 and the controversial decision of the California
Supreme Court in Moore v. Regents of the University of California.2 5
In general, the law states that the individual does not have a property right in
his body, but the medical or scientific entrepreneur, for purposes of research, treat-
ment, or education can exercise such a right, even if she makes an "incidental"
profit by doing so.2 6 As a result of this "incidental" privilege, medical research-
ers, surgeons, and physicians have monopolized the commodification of the body.
Thus, they enjoy actual property rights of possession, rights to patent, and receive
exorbitant fees for their services during the organ transplant/donation process.
Recently, legal scholars have asked whether the mass shortage of willing or-
gan donors, coupled with the advances of life-saving technologies, should give
rise to legislation allowing an individual to sell an organ or other body part for use
by needy recipients or researchers either before or after the donor's death. This
Comment highlights several perspectives of the property analysis underlying these
debates, with a special emphasis on legal liberalism and its failure to provide an
adequate analysis of the phenomenon of body commodification.
The primary flaw in legal liberalism is found in its highly abstract theory of
"personhood," which ignores the concept of the body as concrete, material, and
politically situated. As a result of this systematic omission, legal liberalism ad-
vances a deeply essentialist conception of the rights-bearing subject, which pre-
21. See STARR, supra note 2, at 6.
22. See id. at I10.
23. National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (codified as amended
in several sections throughout 42 U.S.C.).
24. Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1968, 8A U.L.A. 63 (1993) (superseded by Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act of 1987).
25. 793 P.2d 479 (1990).
26. See discussion infra Section III.B.
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vents it from concretely examining either the current practices of commodifying
particular bodies in our economy or the ethical implications of biotechnological
advances in our society.
Section Four examines the recurrent and imbedded themes of commodification
as they reemerge in the current debates surrounding advances in biotechnology
such as cloning and the Human Genome Project. In particular, the virtual paralysis
of both the public and legal policy-makers in response to the controversial cloning
research of Scotland's Roslin Institute is examined. The objection to cloning re-
search appears .to be that the genetic "truth" underlying science has gone beyond
our societal, ethical, and moral limits. This Comment argues, instead, that this
knee-jerk reaction reveals many of the social anxieties relating to medical and
scientific commodification of the body.
Finally, this Comment concludes with the assertion that lawmakers must pro-
vide a more balanced determination between the economic interests involved in
science and medicine and the collective society designed to benefit from these
institutions. Moreover, American society needs to reexamine the current ethical
and legal discourses surrounding science and medicine in order to benefit fully
and equally from new medical and biotechnological advances.
II. THE RISE OF THE MEDICAL PROFESSION
A. The Professional Autiwrity of Science and Medicine
In his Pulitzer Prize winning book, The Social Transformation of American
Medicine,2 7 Paul Starr provides a sobering historical account of the medical
profession's rise to power.2 8 Starr's underlying theme is that any profession gains
power through two important dynamics: legitimacy and dependence. 29 Power
within a profession requires the lay public's dependency on its competence and
knowledge:
Indeed, what makes dependence on the professions so distinctive today is that
their interpretations often govern our understanding of the world and our own
experience. To most of us, this power seems legitimate: When professionals
claim to be authoritative about the nature of reality, whether it is the structure of
an atom, the ego, or the universe, we generally defer to their judgment.30
However, in order to attain this legitimacy and dependence, a profession must
possess three basic components. First, a profession has to be collegial; that is, a
professional must have his or her knowledge and competence validated by peers.
Second, such validation must be based on rational, tested grounds in order to be
competent. Finally, the professional's use of his or her knowledge must be di-
rected toward substantive and moral goals, such as health. 3 1 In this sense, medi-
27. See STAR, supra note 2.
28. See iU There were many factors occurring both from within and outside of the profession
that accounted for much of its rise to power. At the risk of generalizing or being reductive, only
some of the more significant catalysts will be highlighted in this Comment.
29. See STARR, supra note 2, at 4.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 15.
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cine, as a profession, has a unique claim to authority: "Unlike the law and the
clergy, it enjoys close bonds with modem science... [flor most of the last century,
scientific knowledge has held a privileged status in the hierarchy of belief."'3 2
Starr focuses his analysis primarily on the clinical medical practitioner, recog-
nizing that, historically, other medical professionals such as surgeons, researchers,
and pharmacologists had emerged on the "fringe" of the social and cultural author-
ity of medicine. 33 The conception of the "treating" physician primarily serves to
distinguish him from other professionals, and thus he has been venerated in our
culture as a figure of altruism. According to Starr, the unique status of physicians
is due, in large part, to their personal contact with their patients. They act as inter-
mediaries between science and private experience: "For many people, they are the
only contact with a world that otherwise stands at a forbidding distance., 3 4 At the
same time, the cultural authority enjoyed by physicians derives from their self-
legitimating status as professionals, the gate-keepers of a particularly valued form
of erudition concerning how bodies function. As Starr writes:
Patients consult physicians not just for advice, but first of all to find out whether
they are "really" sick.... Cultural authority, in this context, is antecedent to
action. The authority to interpret signs and symptoms, to diagnose health or
illness, to name diseases, and to offer prognoses is the foundation of any social
authority the physician can assume. By shaping the patients' understanding of
their own experience, physicians create the conditions under which their advice
seems appropriate. 35
Thus, physicians, who have been granted the ability to interpret certain scientific
"truths" of the body, have enjoyed a particular cultural distinction which separates
them from other types of professionals, such as lawyers.
B. Origins of Social Transformation: Physician versus "Quack"
Recently, this altruistic and venerated image of the medical profession has
been shaken by the rise of corporate health care and the growing economic incen-
tives involved in medical research. Yet Starr's historical account of the medical
profession suggests that the medical professional, this figure of altruism, was never
outside the market to begin with. That is, our conception of the "pure" medical
professional is, in fact, the result of the profession's marketing of itself as, ironi-
cally, above commercial concerns.
Historically, before it could achieve its exalted social position, the medical
profession had struggled against an ambiguous social and cultural status.3 6
Throughout the nineteenth century, American medicine, in particular, fought to
32. Id. at 4.
33. See id. at 37.
34. Id. at 4-5.
35. Id. at 14.
36. See id. at 6. Starr includes examples such as medicine's status as a low grade profession
under the Romans (doctors were usually slaves or freedmen). See id. Its later improved status
in eighteenth-century England, moreover, was a result of attempts at social cultivation rather
than competence. See id. Despite their efforts, however, physicians were never fully accepted
into aristocratic society: "While ranking above the lowlier surgeons and apothecaries, physi-
cians stood only at the margins of the gentry class, struggling for the patronage of the rich in the
hope of acquiring enough wealth to buy an estate and a title." Id.
[Vol. 5 1:1
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distinguish itself from both ordinary entrepreneurs and "lay" practioners.37 While
modeled after the English, the American medical profession faced an entirely dif-
ferent set of challenges. Unlike European medicine, which pursued the ostensibly
elite and aristocratic practices of a traditional caste system,3 8 American medicine
felt the effects of democratic and egalitarian cultural ideals.39 As a result, many
more "common" citizens could and did take up the title of "doctor."40 Although at
the beginning of the eighteenth century the American medical profession had no
"collective consciousness or organization, 4 1 apprentices who travelled abroad for
a medical education eventually returned with ambitions of creating a professional
standard modeled after the "dignity" of their European peers,4 2 which meant in
practice distinguishing themselves in the public's mind from lay practitioners.
This "wave of professionalism" did not quite swell to the proportions initially
anticipated. Because there was no cultural basis for what might be deemed aristo-
cratic elitism, even the most educated of physicians did not enjoy the same kinds
of social advantages as their European counterparts. Commitment to a democratic
ideal meant that American lay practitioners would not willingly hand over the prac-
tice of medicine to a chosen few who deemed themselves the new professionals.4 3
Although this new professional ideal gave rise to the creation of medical schools,
medical societies, as well as attempts at medical legislation (such as licensing stat-
utes),4 4 the efforts of an elite educated minority to restrict and exclude the lay
practitioner proved largely ineffective. 45
37. See id. at 37.
38. See id. English medicine was part of a social distinction separating physicians, who were
members of a cultured learned profession, from surgeons, who were configured as lowlier crafts-
men, and apothecaries, who were tradesman. See it Physicians did not work with their hands as
did surgeons (who were in the same guild as barbers) but rather "observed, speculated, and
prescribed." Id. at 38. Moreover, no man could gain admission to medical school without first
having graduated from Oxford or Cambridge, although neither University provided a medical
education. See id.
39. See id. at 37.
40. See id. at 39.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 54.
44. See id. at 40. It seems that the key distinction between the licensed and unlicensed was
that the former could use a court of law to collect its fees, while the latter could not. See id. at
44-45.
45. For example, licensing was more of an honorific gesture than a measure of competence:
no educational requirement was needed; no power was given to rescind a license; and there was
virtually nothing substantive to enforce since the license only acknowledged that the recipient
had received it, but did not prohibit anyone else from practicing. See id. at 44. Consequently,
the licenses were used largely to further individual interests of practitioners (as honorific mea-
sures of professionalism) rather than to legitimate a profession collectively. See id. at 45.
Medical societies were similarly ineffective. Other than licensing, there was nothing that
separated the "real" professional from the "quack." In response to this, medical societies at-
tempted to ostracize and isolate the "non-professionals" by denying them all consultation ser-
vices, and further subjecting any member of the society who consulted with a "quack" to a
heavy penalty such as expulsion from the society. See id. The problem was that no one was in
ahurry to join these societies with their rigorous standards and regulated behavior. See id. at 45-
46. The societies' were therefore small, and left unable to either ostracize the "quacks" in any
meaningful way, or to influence their competitors who undercut their prices. See id. at 45.
Moreover, if they relented by admitting a larger number of practitioners in order to pursue their
objectives, they could not create the high standards they desired in order to make the profession
exclusive. See id. at 46. For discussion of the effects of commercialization on medical schools.
see id. at 43- 45.
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In part, the reason that the new professionals could not gain control of the
market was because lay medicine in America had never been viewed as a substi-
tute for "real" medicine, but was instead set up as an "active rival with a coherent
structure of its own." 46 Thus, the nineteenth century popular resistance to profes-
sional medicine did not necessarily reflect opposition to science and modernity
itself, but instead came to express an "extreme form of [American] rationalism" by
adhering to the belief that scientific knowledge should be democratic. 47 Demo-
cratic cultures "have a deep suspicion of all kinds of 'occult' knowledge cultivated
in sects and secret coteries," and it was this suspicion that originally hindered the
legitimacy of the aspiring new professionals of medicine. 48
For example, one of the most well-known movements against the new profes-
sionals in the early nineteenth century was led by botanic Samuel Thomson.4 9 He
opposed the way the new medical professionals controlled knowledge.5 0 Thomson
indicated that many doctors had "learned just enough to know how to deceive
people, and keep them in ignorance, by covering their doings under a language
unknown to their patients."' 5 1 The Thomsonian paradigm was intuitively political:
"[L]earning is to common sense, as aristocracy is to democratic government, as
physicians are to popular healers. ' 52 The nineteenth century public distrusted
medical knowledge because of its seemingly needless complexity:
It had become an article of faith in America that every sphere of social life-law,
government, religion, science, industry--obeyed principles of natural reason and
common sense .... The appearance of complexity was an imposition by a self-
interested class; it was the result of mystification and deception, not of any in-
trinsic difficulty.53
Indeed, the medical profession faced an uphill battle to gain public trust. As
one writer remarked in 1869, "medicine has ever been and is now, the most de-
spised of all the professions which liberally-educated men are expected to enter."5 4
Gaining cultural authority therefore required that a complex body of knowledge
remain in the hands of a few who would mediate between science and the lay
public. This could not be accomplished easily, however, since mid-nineteenth-
century American medicine was still fraught with political infighting and economic
competition that perpetually undermined the unity that is essential to a profession's
collective authority.55
46. Id. at 47.
47. See id. at 56.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 51.
50. See id. at 52.
51. Id.
52. Id. In addition to the already practicing botanics, homeopaths, midwives, and bonesetters
(uneducated but highly skilled artisans specializing in fractures and dislocations),just to name a
few, medicine had long been a responsibility of the domestic sphere of American culture. See id.
at 49.
53. Id. at 56. This cynical inquiry still occurs today. See Gina Kolata, With an Eye On the
Public, Scientists Choose Their Words, N.Y. TwMS, Jan. 6, 1998 at F4.
54. STARR, supra note 2, at 7 (quoting an early American medical professional journal).
55. See id. at 17. See also Roy Porter, Medical Science, Tu CAmaRIDGE ILusTRATm HIsToRY
OF MEICnM 154, 177 (Roy Porter, ed., 1996).
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It was not until the late nineteenth century that the new medical professionals
began gaining legitimacy in American culture. Although many complex social
changes contributed to this cultural authority,56 two significant factors contributed
the most to the improved cultural status of American medicine. First, a new Ameri-
can Medical Association (AMA) constitution allowed the organization to gain con-
trol of the profession by organizing itself to serve as a "confederate" to state medi-
cal societies, which in turn would become confederates of the county organiza-
tions within the states. 57 This new constitution turned previously independent
medical societies into chapters of a larger superstructure.58 Henceforth, member-
ship in any larger society carried with it uniform responsibilities at the local level.
Moreover, the increasing use of railroads, telegraphs, and telephones provided more
access to other professionals beyond individual localities, thereby consolidating
the profession as a whole.59
This new consolidation facilitated good will among members and reliance
upon one another for patient referrals and access to facilities. Exile from theAMA
now carried with it serious economic consequences. 60 Individual alliance with the
profession as a collective was important because those within the profession began
looking out for one another, as evidenced by early examples of doctors in metro-
politan areas who organized common defense funds against malpractice suits.61
In 1908, for example, the Massachusetts Medical Society began defending mal-
practice suits, and during the next ten years only twelve out of the ninety-one
documented suits ever went to trial. The Society won all but one of these suits.62
This period marked the beginning of the term "organized medicine." 63
Second, a new regime of medical education began at John Hopkins Univer-
sity. For the first time, entrance to its four-year medical program required a col-
lege degree.64 John Hopkins would eventually be the institution that shaped medi-
cal education around the country as it "joined science and research ever more firmly
to clinical hospital practice.' 65 As a result of this curricular innovation, American
medical schools became increasingly dominated by scientists and researchers, who
trained physicians according to the "values and standards of academic special-
ists."'66 Medicine was "synthesized" into a larger culture of science.67
56. See. discussion infra Section II.C-D and accompanying notes.
57. See STA, supra note 2, at 109.
58. See id. at 110. AMA membership shot up from eight thousand members in 1900, to
seventy thousand members in 1910, which were half of the physicians in the country. By 1920,
membership included sixty percent of all physicians. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 11.
61. See id.
62. See id. Moreover, the Washington Medical Society won every suit it defended. See id.
63. See id. at 110.
64. See id. at 115.
65. See id. at 116.
66. See id. at 123.
67. See id. at 116. The AMA took steps to eradicate any and all medical schools that did not
strictly conform to the standards embodied in John Hopkins. By 1910, the 162 medical schools
dropped to 131, "as the steadily rising requirements set by the state licensing boards and other
authorities gradually altered the economics of medical education for students and schools alike."
Id. at 118.
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C. The Discourse of Progress in Science and Medicine
The late nineteenth and early twentieth century was an ideal period for the
medical profession to cultivate a new-found cultural authority. The modem age of
industrial capitalism gave rise to sweeping technological advances; science and
medicine found their way into the new discourse of "progress."'68 Popular scien-
tific and medical principles were to a great extent intertwined with the industrial
discourse of mechanization and efficiency. 69 As a result of this mutual discursive
reinforcement, both science and industrialization contributed to the conceptual
mechanization and standardization of the human body.70 As one medical doctor
wrote in 1884: "[T]he nervous system is like a machine presently under strain in
response to the pressures of the machinery in civilized life .... [T]he nervous
system of man is the centre of the nerve-force supplying all the organs of the body."71
The driving force behind this progressive scientific/industrial system was the
rise of new professionals such as inventors, engineers, scientists, and economists
whose discoveries and developments directed the future of a highly regulated and
increasingly technologically efficient society.7 2 Their knowledge was character-
ized by detached, objective, and highly specialized problem solving.73 The medi-
cal profession was no small part of this new wave of "objective" professionalism.
For the first time, the development of new diagnostic techniques enabled the medi-
cal profession to create new ways to replace both the patient's and physician's
subjective judgment with "objective" data. 74 Moreover, standardized tests such as
height and weight charts, eye and I.Q. tests all became a part of "a movement to
identify statistical norms of human physiology and behavior."'7 5 The human sub-
ject thus became the object of scientific study, and objectification of the human
body became an element in the consolidation of scientific and medical authority. 76
D. The Aesthetics of Science and Medicine
In this new mechanized world of industrial lalor and commodification on a
mass scale, images of the scientific/industrial body increasingly became an object
of overlapping social, cultural, and economic thought. 77 The language of mecha-
nization, standardization, and commodification pervaded all levels of social con-
sciousness.7 8 Even at the outset of the industrial revolution, this technological
68. See EDWARD A. PuRcma., JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM &
THE PROBLEM OF VALUB 6 (1973) ("The whole impact of vast social change... made it clear that
science was also the way to power. What was good in the changes seemed the result of science;
what was bad seemed eradicable only with the aid of more science."). See also STARR, supra
note 2, at 142 (discussing the new market for specialized knowledge).
69. See ALAN TRACHTENBERO, THE INCORPORATION OF AMERICA: CULTURE & Socry IN TiE GUa.n
AGE 68-69 (1982).
70. See id. See also ALAN HYDE, BODIEs oF LAw 38 (1997).
7 1. TRAcHTENBURG, supra note 69, at 47.
72. See id. at 68-69.
73. See id at 64.
74. See STARR, supra note 2, at 136. This was done through new diagnostic machines such as
the spirometer and electrocardiograph. See id. at 136-37.
75. See id. at 137.
76. See HYDE, supra note 70, at 35-39.
77. See TRACHTENBERG, supra note 69, at 45.
78. See id. For further discussion of the development of mass marketing in the department
store and its standardization of clothing, shoe sizes, housewares, and furniture, see id. at 129-
31.
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progress was viewed as an inevitable, incalculable force.79 Critics were left won-
dering whether the technological advances underlying the new Industrial America
promised a future of progress or peril.80
The negative images of labor and commodification from this period have had
an enduring effect on the American cultural imagination. During this period, jour-
nalistic accounts characterized industrial labor as an exhausted and alienated work-
ing body lacking individual identity.8 1 The body-as-machine metaphor further
gave rise to concepts of commodity and ownership in the body of the laborer it-
self.82 Literature and art were influenced by a "naturalist" movement where tropes
of fragmentation (threatening the "organic whole" of individuality) and repetition
(making one individual indistinguishable from another) allowed narrators to rep-
resent human bodies as both scientific case studies83 and as faceless organic corn-
modities.84
The images are powerful and enduring ones; they also had subtle effects on
the history of medicine. As the aesthetics of commodification became more preva-
lent, physicians-the most esteemed emissaries of science-benefitted from this
new cultural aesthetic. 85 For instance, medical photography claimed a special
authoritative role in cultural display.8 6 For the first time, both medical books and
79. See id. at 54-55.
80. Trachtenberg writes:
The image of the machine... proved to be a complex symbol, increasingly charged
with contradictory meanings and implications. If the machine seemed the prime cause
of the abundance of new products changing the character of daily life, it also seemed
responsible for newly visible poverty, slums, and an unexpected wretchedness of in-
dustrial conditions.
Id. at38.
81. See HYDF, supra note 70, at 34-39; TRacrmNamo, supra note 69. at 44-45.
82. See HYDE, supra note 70, at 56; TRACmrr NBE, supra note 69, at 75.
83. See TRA~cHraNmBG, supra note 69, at 159 (quoting Walt Whitman, who viewed the Ameri-
can industrial scene with the objective disdain and "severe eyes" of a "physician diagnosing
some deep disease"). Trachtenberg also describes the reaction to Thomas Eakins' paintings.
See id. at 183. See also HYDE, supra note 70. at 39-41. For an illustrative example of how
naturalist authors described characters as scientific case studies, see FiWx NoRams, McTEAGUt
3, 22-23 (Penguin Books 1994) (1899).
84. See HYD, supra note 70, at 24, 39-41. For an illustrative example of commodification
tropes of mechanization and repetition in literature, see THronoR DPELns, S=srm CARRm 39,
351 (Penguin Books 1980) (1900); E. m.EZoLA, THm LADts' PARADSB6, 250,253 (Brian Nelson
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1995) (1883); Herman Melville, Bartelby, The Scrivener: A Story of
WaIlstreet, in GRrAT SHoRt WoRKS OF E M .vuE 46 (Warner Berthoff, ed., Harper &
Row 1969) (1853-56).
85. See HYDF, supra note 70, at 24, 38-39; Condit, supra note 15. at 220 ("Just as aesthetic
appeal may take the place of naturalization, so does technological description. The emphasis on
technique replaces social values with technical protocol. The public concern is thereby directed
to understanding 'how it is done' rather than asking 'how should it be limited, shaped, or regu-
lated?"').
86. See Chris Amirault, Posing the Subject of Early Medical Photography, 16.2 DtscouPSi,
THEORmEcAL Srunms ni MEDtA AND CuDtuE 59-61 (Winter 1993-94). Amirault writes:
[While metaphysics, morality, and medicine are limited by their "peculiar views,
definitions, and classifications," medical photography transcended the limits of lan-
guage and discursivity.... [It] was constructed as the perfect technology at a moment
in which medicine was staking its claim as a discourse of scientific, objective truth
through visual knowledge.
Id. at 58, 60.
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medical exhibits in art galleries allowed the lay public to view the human body as
an object of medical study. Medical photography occupied a special place in nine-
teenth-century discourse because, while aestheticized, it projected itself as devoid
of any subjective influence: It "strive[d] to construct itself as doubly transpar-
ent-through the discourses of photography and of medicine." 87 The power of
objective medical knowledge, and particularly the abstracted, impersonal medical
gaze, was on display.88
Even as literature reacted in horror to the image of the objectified body, this
very image contributed to the formation of modem forms of medical expertise. By
identifying itself with the new "objective" discourse of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, the medical profession attained this cultural legitimacy
even as it capitalized on the new market economy.
E. The Economic Autonomy of Medicine
This paradox bears reiteration: while the commodification of labor, fashion,
art, and literature were the sites of intense political debate in the latter part of the
nineteenth century, science and medicine held a special place in American culture.
The ability to interpret arcane and forbidding knowledge endowed science and
medicine with the cultural authority to impart "objective truth." As a result of this
monopoly of knowledge, the medical profession maintained its independence
through self-regulation. This independence extended to the medical profession's
economic practices. As a collective profession it had affirmatively resisted corpo-
rate interference, not out of higher altruistic goals, but to maintain its freedom
from private investors and governmental interference. 89 During this time, the AMA
did not allow any third-party investor to profit from a physician's services (al-
though it did allow medical groups, such as partnership companies, 9 0 to profit
from the work of other doctors).9 1 Ironically, even as it consolidated its power
87. Id. at 59. Quoting Michel Foucault, Amirault also writes that medical discourse is struc-
tured "by a path in which it must efface each of its steps, because it attains its aim in a gradual
neutralization of itself." Id.
88. See Ludmilla Jordanova, Medicine and Genres of Display, in VISUAL DIsPLAY, CULruiu
BEYoND APPEARANcES 210 (Lynne Cooke and Peter Wollen eds., Bay Press Seattle 1995) ("At
stake here was the identity of medicine and its practioners. Medical forms of display were ways
of imagining medicine, of testing possibilities, of making claims and assertions."). See also
Amirault, supra note 86, at 59-61 (describing how photographers used an excess of display with
respect to both the scenery and the subject around the medical wound or affliction, and hence,
why medical photography was not "objective").
89. See STAiM, supra note 2, at 220. Starr writes:
Corporate capitalism was kept out of medicine partly because of the support that
courts, legislatures, unions, and the public gave to the ideal of a free profession; partly
because of the absence of any decisive competitive advantage of corporate organiza-
tion in medical practice at this stage.., and partly because of the economic power
over organizations possessed by doctors as a result of their direct relation to patients.
Id. at 220.
90. See id. at 213 ("Although they were profit-making organizations, group practices were
not all legally organized as corporations. Many had created a dual organizational structure: a
clinic organization comprising the medical practitioners and a property corporation that owned
the plant and equipment.").
91. See id. at 216. Even new physicians employed by these private medical partnerships
were not analogous-to industrial workers because, as highly specialized professionals, they were
too economically valuable to treat lightly. If a "doctor threatened to leave, he might take his
patients with him." Id. at 217.
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over its own economic destiny, the medical profession was presenting itself as free
of ordinary economic interests. By refusing to join forces with non-medical cor-
porate investors, then, the medical profession projected itself as being "above the
[common] market and pure commercialism." 92
This second central paradox parallels the first one: the medical profession
gained economic privilege while appearing to be above it, just as it had gained the
status of trusted, disinterested authority by aligning itself with the very imagery of
commodification of the body, which was elsewhere being reviled as inhumane and
degrading. Fortuitously, then, the complex changes that overturned an entire soci-
ety allowed the medical profession to emerge intact as a preeminent cultural au-
thority. The strength of the medical profession as a class necessarily required
legitimation from those outside of it. Notwithstanding the social contribution of
scientific and medical advances, the pervasive cultural erasure of the commercial
nature of the enterprise was among the crowning achievements of science and
medicine.93
Ill. THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE BODY IN SCIENTIFIC AND MEDICAL RESEARCH
Like the progress promised by the Industrial Revolution, advances in science
and medicine have long been perceived as an inevitable evolution of knowledge. 94
Yet, the "naturalization" of science and medicine as vehicles of abstract, disinter-
ested truths obscures their roles as concrete, material social institutions. This
reification has led to two extreme reactions to scientific and medical advances:
science and medicine are either venerated for their contributions to human progress,
or vilified for their contribution to the destruction of human values. Both views
begin with the assumption that science and medicine have no institutional and
political origin. Science and medicine, in this sense, are perceived as "objective"
truths that were "discovered" as opposed to historically and culturally interpreted.95
Here we must turn to the law. Although public perception of the medical
profession has consistently been comprised of a mixture of dependency and dis-
trust, law-makers have long viewed science and medicine in their venerated forms.96
By assuming that science and medicine somehow operate outside the confines of
the market, and by characterizing the profit made from science and medicine as
"incidental" to their larger goals, the law has effectively set the institutions of
science and medicine apart from other institutions in policy-making.
The current legal status of the medical profession is a privileged one, in part,
because courts and legislatures have consistently protected its interests through
laws governing commodification of the body. Consider the following examples
involving property rights in the body and the legal deference shown the medical
profession with respect to this issue.
92. Id. at 23.
93. See id. at 144.
94. See discussion supra Section II.C.
95. See generally, EMARD A. PURcm, JR., THe CrusIs OF DasocRmc THEORY, Scmmmc
NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALU 267-68 (1973).
96. For a more in-depth treatment of legal deference shown scientific institutions, see gener-
ally SHEm.A JASANOF, ScrIaE AT 'Tm BAR, LAW, ScmNCE, AND Taoum0Loy IN mERICA (1995).
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A. Perceptions Surrounding Organ Donation
In addition to the psychological factors involved in the resistance to donating
a body part, public distrust of the medical profession has largely contributed to the
reluctance of many to donate organs. Much of this distrust derives from popular
perception of the medical profession as presented in the media. Abundant media
stories highlighting rogue factions or individuals within science and medicine serve
to fuel this extreme perception: Chinese prisoners have been executed on an organ
donation time-table;97 transplant surgeons have been under investigation for ille-
gal drug sales and profit-making; 98 public officials have received deferential treat-
ment by moving more quickly up the organ transplant waiting list;99 overwhelm-
ing racial disparities govern who receives an organ; 100 and medical professionals
have sparred over the right to dead bodies.101
Given these media depictions of the medical profession, it is no wonder that
we are reluctant to donate life-saving organs. Donating an organ to be used after
death creates the image of ourselves on the brink of life and death with a doctor
deciding whether our life is worth saving. In this extreme state, one might wonder
if the fact that his body could supply a very scarce resource might color the doctor's
decision. These may seem to be cynical considerations, but they are not uncom-
mon themes in the resistance to voluntary organ donation. Yet, by examining the
current practices involved in organ donation, one can see how this reluctance to
donate organs, while extreme, does rest on a basis of truth: (1) organs are a scarce
resource; and (2) the medical profession has full discretion to govern the alloca-
tion of this resource.
B. The Organ Donation Process
Medical research has been responsible for a significant increase in survival
rates for organ transplant patients, largely through the development of immuno-
suppressive drugs that prevent the donee's body from rejecting the new organs. 102
As a result, transplants have more than doubled since 1981, and the corresponding
97. See Owen, supra note 10, at 495; see also Drew, supra note 10, atAl; Sun, supra note 10,
at A22.
98. See Christopher Anderson, Scandal Scars Minnesota Medical School, Sci., Dec. 17, 1993,
at 1812 (selling immunosuppressive drug without FDA approval).
99. See Claudia Coates, Casey's Quick Transplant Renews Ethics Debate, L.A. Timas, July
25, 1993, at 3 (discussing how public officials and the wealthy move up faster on the list than do
others).
100. See David Bauder, Blacks Wait Longer for Kidney Transplants, L.A. Tsmms, Nov. 24,
1991, at A22. For example, although African Americans constitute approximately 12% of the
population, they account for nearly 30% of patients on the national waiting list. See Fred H.
Cate, Human Organ Transplantation: The Role of Law, 20 J. CORP. L. 69, 87 (Spring 1995).
However, they walt twice as long as White Americans for a kidney transplant. See Jeff Testerman,
Should Donors Say Who Gets Organs?, ST. PTRSBURG TinS, Jan. 9, 1994, at IA.
101. See Sally Squires, Two Agencies in a Grim Battle Over Bodies, WASH. PoST, Nov. 18,
1993, at C1; Sally Squires, Transplant Tug-of-War, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 1993, at Z7.
102. See Fred H. Cate, Human Organ Transplantation: The Role of Law, 20 J. Copu. L. 69,
69-70 (Spring 1995).
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increase in demand has rendered the current organ supply inadequate. 103 It is no
exaggeration to state that organ supply is in a state of crisis. 104
Predicting this increased demand in 1983, H. Barry Jacobs, a former Virginia
doctor, informed the Surgeon General of his plans to start a kidney-brokering com-
pany. 105 Jacobs planned to create a network that would broker the sale of kidneys
from indigent U.S. citizens and Third World donors, based on their "pure, free
choice," 10 6 to those who needed, and could pay for, the organs. Jacobs said to the
Washington Post, "It's a very lucrative, potential business. If the 'haves' want it,
they'll have to pay. If the 'have nots' want it, they'll have to pay too."1I0 7 For his
services, Jacobs would receive a commission between $2,000 and $5,000. While
the National Kidney Foundation and the Washington Area Transplant Society did
not endorse his project, Jacobs claimed that several American hospitals had ex-
pressed interest. 10 8
Response to the doctor's plan could be best described as outrage. Al Gore,
then Representative of Tennessee, objected that "[olur system of values isn't sup-
posed to allow the auctioning off of life to the highest bidder .... It erodes the
distinction between things and people." 109 The Director of the Red Cross also
expressed concern as to how far an indigent donor might go in selling a vital organ
if desperate to provide for loved ones: "Any millionaire with cirrhosis of the liver
will gladly pay a half million dollars. That's not considered to be the American
way."110
In response to the implications of Jacobs's proposal, Congress passed the Na-
tional Organ Transplant Act (NOTA). InI Among other things, NOTA prohibits the
purchase or sale of human organs for "valuable consideration," 112 and was de-
103. See id.
104. See id. at 70-71. For example, Cate states:
[1]n 1990,18,592 people needed a transplanted kidney (only half received one); 40,959
needed a heart (only one in twenty received one); 14,751 needed a liver (only one in
five received one); 4,108 needed a pancreas (only one in eight got one); and 4,618
needed a combination heart-lung (fewer than one in eighty-five received one).
Id. at 70. One person dies every four hours while waiting for a life saving organ. See id.
105. See Margaret Engel, Va. Doctor Plans Company to Arrange Sale of Human Kidneys,
WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1983, at A9. H. Barry Jacobs had his license revoked after spending ten
months in jail for a 1977 mail fraud conviction that included Medicare and Medicaid. See id.
He later served as a consultant in medical malpractice suits. See id.
106. See id. Sincemostofthe donors would not be able to read or write, the plan, he assured,
would entail fully informed consent through tape-recorded conferences. See iU. All that donors
would have to do, then, is "set a price of up to $10,000 for one of their kidneys." Id.
107. Id.
108. See id.
109. Ellen Goodman, Life for Sale, WVASH. Posr, Oct. 1, 1983, atAl5.
110. Engel, sitpra note 105, at A9.
111. National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (codified as amended
in several sections throughout 42 U.S.C. beginning at § 273).
112. 41 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (1994) (stipulating that "consideration" does not include hospital
and other necessary medical expenses involved in the removal of the organ).
Subsection (c)(1) defines human organ as any "human (including fetal) kidney, liver, heart,
lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin or any subpart thereof and any other
human organ (or subpart thereof, including that derived from a fetus) specified by the Secretary
of Health and Human Services by regulation." 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(1).
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signed, in theory, to facilitate an increase of organ donation through networking
information and by relying on the altruism of donors.1 13 Congress enacted this
legislation, in part, out of its concern that poorer classes of people would be ex-
ploited by wealthier individuals who needed organs. 114 The prohibition on the
sale of body parts was primarily a measure to protect the dignity of the individual. 115
Unfortunately, compared to the abundance of legislation surrounding pre-
scription drugs and medical care, NOTA's provisions were "skeletal" at best and
largely ineffective. 1 16 The primary focus of the statute was on preventing the
exploitation of donors and their families. 117 Thus, the statute effectively afforded
to medical professionals broad discretion to determine who could receive an or-
gan.1 18 Among the consequences of the medical profession's control over such a
scarce resource under NOTA has been an inequitable distribution of organs. 119
This broad discretion has also yielded tremendous economic benefits to hospi-
tals.120
For example, some transplant hospitals marked up their services as much as
200%. Typical organ transplant costs approximate $100,000, and the subsequent
medical care associated with it is estimated at an additional $17,000 to $68,000
annually. 12 1 The latter cost primarily consists of the need for immunosuppressive
Blood may be transferred for valuable consideration because the transfer is not considered a
sale of goods, but rather a service rendered by the donor. This distinction prevents the donor,
hospital, and bloodbank from being subject to the strict liability rules involved in a sale of
goods. A blood provider can be held liable only for negligence in handling blood. See Philippe
Ducor, The Legal Status of Human Materials, 44 DRAmK L. RaV. 195, 247 (1996).
Up until this time UAGA governed the conditions under which organs could be transferred.
However, nothing in the UAGA at that time had expressly prohibited the sale of organs. See
U~iF. ANATOMICAL GiFrAcr 8A U.L.A. 63 (1968) (amended 1987). The UAGA was later amended
in 1987 to conform to NOTA's prohibition of organ sales. See UNW. ANATOMICAL GIFr Acr § 10,
8A U.L.A. 19 (1998).
113. See Cate, supra note 102, at 80-81. NOTA served five other principal functions: [1] to
establish a 25-member task force on Organ Procurement and Transplantation that would exam-
ine the various medical, scientific, economic, and social issues surrounding organ transplants
and procurement; [2] to require the Secretary of Health and Human Services to examine the
possibility of establishing a national registry of voluntary bone marrow donors; [3] to create the
Division of Organ Transplantation; [4] to empower the Secretary to create organ procurement
organizations; and [5] to require the Secretary to contract for an Organ Procurement and Trans-
plantation Network and a Scientific Registry. See id. at 76.
114. See id. at 79-80.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 80. This ineffectiveness was due in large part to the minimal funding devoted
to its implementation, and in its deferral to private industry and the states to standardize and
regulate organ procurement, distribution, and transplant services. See id.
117. See id. at 81.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 88.
120. See id. See also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Patients'Lives on the Line In Battle Over Trans-
plants, N.Y. TimS, Mar. 25, 1998, at Al (reporting on the current battle over proposed federal
guidelines addressing the fairness of organ distribution, and how lobbyists are fighting to main-
tain the economic interests of competing transplant centers); Liver Spots: Organ Transplants,
ECONOMIST Jan. 25, 1997 at 25 (reporting on the resistance of transplant centers to allow the
Department of Health and Human Services to take over the responsibility of allocating organs).
121. See Cate, supra note 102, at 88.
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drugs to prevent the body from rejecting the new organ. Because of this exorbitant
cost, no one is allowed on the national waiting list unless he or she can pass the
"green screen," that is, until he or she can demonstrate an ability to pay the medi-
cal costs. 122 Although Medicaid and Medicare will pay for most transplants, nearly
sixty million people do not have insurance. 123 Moreover, Medicare will only pay
for the immunosuppressive drugs for up to thirty-six months (recently increased
from eighteen months) even though a lifetime of immunosuppressive therapy is
essential to the donee's survival. Incidentally, those whose Medicare runs out
must reapply for-and hope to receive-another transplant in order to maintain
continued coverage. 124
Congress appears intent to defer to the "altruism" of organ donors from its
prohibition on the sale or purchase of organs for transplant, but it has yet to pro-
vide legislation that seriously considers (or reconsiders) the growing economic
windfall to the medical profession. 12 5 At present, it seems that the medical profes-
sion is the only entity that can receive "valuable consideration" for transfer of
organs in the donation process.
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1987 (UAGA) 126 also prohibits the sale
or purchase of organs for transplant purposes, 127 but further establishes a broader
restriction by prohibiting the sale or purchase of body "parts." 12 8 Although an
individual may not sell or buy these parts, he or she may donate them to certain
people and institutions. 129 The UAGA further governs these conditions under
which organs may be donated. 130
Unlike NOTA, however, UAGA also contains a provision that requires medi-
cal professionals to inquire with the family or next of kin into organ donation of a
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id. Only recently have bills been introduced to the House and Senate to increase
federal regulation. The most significant provisions of these bills sought [1] to establish a single
national list for organ transplant so that the National Registry will no longer be able to allocate
organs based on a consensus of medical professionals; [2] to redirect NOTA's "altruistic" focus
to those on the waiting list; and [3] to reduce the Division of Organ Transplant Boards of Direc-
tors from thirty-two to twenty-one, and to require at least one-third of those boards be comprised
of recipients and recipients' families, donors and donor families, and those on the waiting list for
organs. See id. at 80-81. Cate reports that although the bills did not pass the 1994 legislative
year, the Secretary of Health and Human Services finally did issue the comprehensive regula-
tions applying to recipients and transplant organizations that were four years overdue. See id. at
81.
125. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Patients' Lives on the Line In Battle Over Transplants, N.Y.
Tams, Mar. 25, 1998, at Al.
126. UNirO ANATOMICAL GurrAcr, 8A U.L.A. 63 (1968) (amended 1987).
127. See UAGA 1987, § 10, 8A U.L.A. 19 (1993).
128. See i. Under the UAGA, a "part" is defined as: "an organ, tissue, eye, bone, artery,
blood, fluid, or other portion of a human body." See id. § 1(7).
129. An anatomical gift that is authorized by the donor may not be revoked by another even
after the donor's death. See id. § 2(h).
130. See id. §§ 2-4, 6. Essentially, an individual over eighteen years of age may make or
refuse to make, an anatomical gift. See id. § 2(a). Where a decedent has neither made nor
expressed opposition to making an anatomical gift, another person may donate all or part of the
decedent's body, provided that the person is either a spouse, adult sibling, adult son or daughter,
parent, grandparent, guardian, or any other person authorized or under obligation to dispose of
the body. See id. §§ 3(a), 4(a).
dying or deceased patient.13 1 However, due to the emotional state of most loved
ones, medical professionals rarely ask for organ donations out of fear of ill-timing
and insensitivity. 132 To counter this ineffective provision, UAGA also contains a
"presumed consent" provision that allows coroners and health officials to release
all or part of a cadaver within the official's custody without affirmative consent
from either the deceased or next of kin, provided that the official has received a
request for the part from a hospital, physician, surgeon, or procurement organiza-
tion. 133 This provision requires only that the official make a "reasonable effort,
taking into account the useful life of the part," to inquire as to whether the dece-
dent affirmatively has made or refused to make an anatomical donation (through
medical records), or, in the alternative, to locate the other persons who can make
that decision for the deceased and inform that person of the options available. 134
Thus, in the absence of readily available information as to the affirmative
choice of either the deceased or a next of kin to donate body parts, coroners and
health officials are authorized to remove body parts from the deceased without
consent. This presumed consent provision has been attacked for the broad discre-
tion it gives coroners and health officials to accommodate the "requesting" physi-
cian. 135 Nevertheless, courts generally have supported the notion of presumed
consent as a means of accommodating those in need with a much valued resource,
and thus invariably have ruled in favor of protecting these medical practices. 13 6 In
effect, unless a person during their lifetime affirmatively denies the use of their
body after death, the medical profession has a legal and economic right to it. Al-
truism on the part of the donor will be presumed.
However, the altruistic policy underlying both the UAGA's and NOTA's pro-
hibitions of the sale or purchase of the body, ironically, does not prevent the medi-
cal profession from profiting from these "parts," so long as they do not purchase
Persons and institutions authorized to receive the anatomical part include hospitals, physi-
cians, surgeons, or procurement organizations, for the purposes of transplantation, therapy, medi-
cal, or dental education, research, or advancement of medical or dental science; accredited medical
or dental schools, colleges, or universities for education, research, or advancement of medical or
dental science; and designated individuals for transplant or therapy needed by such individuals.
See id. § 6(a).
131. See id. § 3(a).
132. See Cate, supra note 102, at 83. Although, as of 1992, forty-six states and the District of
Columbia had established a duty of inquiry, to this day no government agency has ever enforced
a violation of the "inquiry" duty, thus making the requirement wholly ineffective to procuring
anatomical donations. See id. at 73, 83.
133. See UAGA 1987 § 4.
134. See id. The actual removal of the body part is done by a physician, surgeon, or techni-
cian (or in the case of eyes, an enucleator). See id. § 4(4). This presumed consent provision has
been adopted in twenty-one states. See Cate, supra note 102, at 84.
135. See, e.g., Erik S. Jaffe, She's Got Bette Davis[ 's Eyes: Assessing the Nonconsensual
Removal of Cadaver Organs Under the Takings and Due Process Clauses, 90 CoLUM. L. Rnv.
528, 547 (1990) (arguing, in part, that survivors of the deceased should have a property right in
the decedent's corpse).
136. See Perry v. Saint Francis Hosp., 865 F. Supp. 724, 729 (D. Kan. 1994) (holding that
plaintiff could not recover for emotional distress because the hospital and Red Cross could
remove eyes and long bones from the recently deceased); Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant,
335 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. 1985) (upholding constitutionality of statute allowing removal of corneal
tissue, despite challenge by mother of dead infant).
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them outright from the donor. Interestingly, NOTA only prohibits sales or pur-
chases of organs for the purpose of transplantation,137 and the UAGA only for
"transplantation or therapy" of "parts" after death. 13 8 In other words, on their
faces, both statutes would seem to allow, by omission, the private sale of body
parts for purposes other than transplantation or therapy, such as research, educa-
tion, or to "advance" medical science.
In 1990, the California Supreme Court spoke to this omission in Moore i:
Regents of the University of California.139 In October 1976, John Moore began
treatment at the University of California Medical Center in Los Angeles for a form
of cancer known as "hairy-cell" leukemia. 140 His doctor, Golde, recommended
the removal of Moore's spleen which had been enlarged due to the disease. 14 1
During the course of treatment, Dr. Golde and a lab technician, Shirley Quan,
determined that Moore's cells were unique and, as such, were of great "commer-
cial and scientific" value.14 2 For a period of seven years after the spleen removal,
Moore travelled back and forth several times between his home in Seattle, Wash-
ington and the Los Angeles hospital so that Golde could take tissue samples and
monitor Moore's condition. 143 During these visits, Golde also withdrew samples
of blood, blood serum, bone marrow aspirate, skin, and sperm all the while telling
Moore that the visits and samples were "necessary and required for his health and
well-being." 144 Unbeknownst to Moore, however, Golde and Quan were using
Moore's cells for research to develop a cell line capable of "producing pharmaceu-
tical products of enormous therapeutic and commercial value." 14 5
In 1984, Golde and Quan patented the cell line, and it was estimated that by
1990 the market potential of the products derived from the cell patent would ex-
ceed three billion dollars.146 Golde and Quan contracted with Sandoz Pharmaceu-
ticals and Genetics Institute, Inc. for the rights to the 'Mo"" cell line (named after
Moore), 147 and the products derived therefrom. 14 8 As a result, Golde, Quan, and
the Regents of the University of California received hundreds of thousands of dol-
lars. 149
Subsequently, Moore filed suit in the California Superior Court against Golde,
Quan, the Regents, Sandoz, and Genetics, Inc. seeking recovery for, among other
things, conversion of his spleen and the cells therein. 150 Moore also claimed a
propriety interest in any product created from his cells or the cell line.15 1 The
137. See NOTA, 42 U.S.C. § 274e (1994).
138. See UAGA 1987, § 10, 8A U.L.A. 19 (1993). Sections 3 and 4 that govern the condi-
tions of how, and to whom, a body part may be transferred refer only to donation. See id. §§ 3-
4.
139. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
140. See id. at480.
141. See id. at481.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. Id.
145. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494,498 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
146. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479,482 (1990).
147. See id. at 509 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
148. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
149. See id.
150. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d at 482.
151. See id. at 487.
Superior Court sustained defendant's demurrers to the allegation of conversion, 152
but the Court of Appeal reversed holding that Moore's spleen was his personal
property. 153 Lacking controlling precedent to the contrary, the appellate court
relied primarily on the 1976 Maryland Court of Appeals decision, Venner v. State. 154
In Venner, the defendant "drug mule 15 5 was charged with drug trafficking
when he was brought to the hospital in a semi-conscious state after swallowing
several balloons containing hashish oil. 156 Because Venner would not consent to
internal surgery to remove the balloons, the police instructed the hospital to con-
tact them when the defendant passed the balloons in his feces.! 57 After the bal-
loons were passed, the police subsequently took possession of them for evidence. 15 8
On appeal from his conviction, the defendant claimed that his Fourth Amendment
right had been violated because the police action constituted an illegal search and
seizure of his property. 159 The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the defendant
did indeed have a property interest in his feces: "[I]t [can]not be said that a person
has no property right in the wastes or other materials which were once part of or
contained within his body, but which normally are discarded after their separation
from the body." 160 The court reasoned that it was not uncommon for one to assert,
"for good reason or for no reason," the rights of ownership in or control over such
things as fluid waste, secretions, hair, fingernails, blood, organs, or other body
parts, whether they were separated from the body intentionally, accidentally, or
merely as a result of normal bodily functions. 16 1
In addition to the Venner decision, the California Court of Appeals also relied
upon a line of cases that recognize and protect a property interest in the plaintiff's
identity. 162 The court reasoned that "[a]ll human traits, including weight, strength,
height, sex, skin color, hair texture, fingerprint pattern, blood type, intelligence,
and aspects of personality.. .are ultimately determined by the information encoded
in the DNA."'163 The court then asked, "If the courts have found a sufficient pro-
prietary interest in one's persona, how could one not have a right in one's own
genetic material, something far more profoundly the essence of one's human unique-
152. See id. at 482.
153. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
154. 354 A.2d 483 (1976).
155. A person who is hired to transport drugs on or within their body.
156. See Venner v. State of Maryland, 354 A.2d at 485.
157. See id. at 486.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 489.
160. Id. at 498.
161. See id.
162. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. at 507 (citing Motschenbacher
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d. 821 (9th Cir. 1974) ("We need not decide whether they
would do so under the rubric of 'privacy,"property,'or 'publicity'; we only determine that they
would recognize such an interest and protect it."); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425
(Cal. 1979) (finding the right of "likeness" to be personal to Lugosi so that it could survive him).
For a similar discussion of property rights in identity, see Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953) (holding that plaintiff had a property right in
his identity used by defendant in photograph).
163. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
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ness than a name or a face?" 164 It then held that Moore had a property interest in
the cells of his body.165
The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that while Moore did state a
cause of action against the doctor for breach of fiduciary duty for failure to obtain
Moore's informed consent, he did not have a property interest in his spleen or any
of the products derived therefrom. 166 The court also rejected the Court of Appeal's
reliance on cases that had found a proprietary interest in an individual's identity
and distinguished Moore on its facts. 167 Moreover, the court stated that the lym-
phokines derived from Moore's genes that were subsequently used in the patent-
able cell-line, "unlike a name or a face, have the same molecular structure... in
every human being's immune system.... [I]t [was] no more unique to Moore than
the number of vertebrae in the spine or the chemical formula of hemoglobin." 168
In his dissent, Justice Mosk challenged the integrity of the court by pointing
out that the "science" that the majority relied upon in its decision had originated in
the sources in the appendix of the defendant's brief. Given that this case had not
yet been tried, Justice Mosk pointed out that the science expounded in the
defendant's brief should not have been considered as evidence:
I dissociate myself completely from the amateur biology lecture that the majority
impose on us throughout their opinion.... [E]very one of the medical articles
now relied on by the majority came into their possession as reprints furnished to
this court by one of the parties to this lawsuit-obviously not an unbiased source.
... They risk presenting only one side of the story; it may well be that other
researchers have reached different or even contrary results... that defendants,
acting in self-interest, have not furnished to the court. 169
Indeed, the majority treated the defendants' interpretation of scientific theo-
ries as representative of "objective" science itself, and thus not open to subjective
interpretation, notwithstanding the fact that the theories were espoused from an
adversarial position.
The majority also stated that in balancing policy considerations, it should con-
sider whether to protect against liability those "innocent parties who are engaged
in socially useful activities, such as researchers who have no reason to believe that
their use of a particular cell sample is, or may be, against a donor's wishes." 170 It
further stated that if the court were to grant a property right in the body to individu-
als, the uncertainty surrounding liability could adversely affect investment in medi-
cal research and the development of its products: "Since inventions containing
human tissues and cells may be patented and licensed for commercial use, compa-
nies are unlikely to invest heavily in developing, manufacturing, or marketing a
product when uncertainty about clear title exists." 17 1 The court also stated that
164. Id.
165. See id. at 508. The court stated, "If this science has become science for profit, then we
fail to see any justification for excluding the patient from participation in those profits." Id. at
509.
166. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479,497 (Cal. 1990).
167. See id. at 490. The court reasoned that the earlier cases had addressed the issue of
privacy, while only property can be the subject of conversion.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 521,523 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 493.
171. Ida a1494.
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"the theory of liability that Moore urges us to endorse threatens to destroy the
economic incentive to conduct important medical research." 17 2
The court expressly addressed the question of whether the body should be-
come "a fungible article of commerce" 173 when it reasoned:
[T]he difference here.., lies in the nature of the conflicting moral, philosophical
and even religious values at stake, and in the profound implications of the posi-
tion [Moore] urge[s]. The ramifications of recognizing and enforcing a property
interest in body tissues are not known, but are greatly feared-the effect on hu-
man dignity of a marketplace in human body parts, the impact on research and
the development of competitive bidding for such materials, and the exposure of
researchers to potentially limitless and uncharted tort liability."' 174
What is remarkable about the majority's reasoning is that it had no problem
allowing the researchers to profit from an already existing "marketplace in human
body parts," to place Moore's body on that market, and to hold out for the highest
competitive bidder. 175 Effectively, the court recognized a property right in Moore's
cells with respect to the researcher's interest therein, but not a property right with
respect to Moore's interest. The court found the cell-line to be the result of Moore's
abandoned spleen1 76 from which the medical researchers mixed their scientific
genius: "[development of] cell lines.. .[is] 'often considered an art .. .,' [and i]t is
this inventive effort that patent law rewards, not the discovery of naturally occur-
ring raw materials." 17 7
Recognizing this double standard, Justice Mosk took issue with the majority's
definition of "scientific use": "It would stretch the English language beyond rec-
ognition... to say that commercial exploitation of the kind and degree alleged
here is also a usual and ordinary meaning of the phrase 'scientific use.' [Golde and
Quan] were not only scientists, they were also full-fledged entrepreneurs." 178
In his partial dissent, Justice Broussard also took issue with the inherent con-
tradictions in the majority's reasoning. However, unlike Justice Mosk, who ar-
gued that Moore was entitled to an alienable property right in his own body, Jus-
tice Broussard suggested that if advances in science and medicine were truly a
superior goal deserving of special treatment, then knowledge of potentially life-
saving research was not a resource to be held by a chosen few for profit. 17 9 In-
stead, he suggested that, as a matter of public policy and morality, no one should
be making a profit off of human body parts, and that a fortuitous discovery should
be deposited in a repository which "would make such materials freely available to
all scientists for the betterment of society as a whole." 180 However, he qualified
this suggestion by asserting that this public policy consideration was a matter to be
decided by the legislature. 18 1
172. Id. at 495.
173. ld. at 498.
174. Id.
175. See id. at 511 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
176. See id. at 491-92. The court's rationale appears based in a property theory of abandon-
ment. The court reasoned that Moore had no interest in his excised body parts under the Califor-
nia Health and Safety Codes, which required the disposal of all human waste. See id.
177. Id. at 493 (citation omitted).
178. Id. at 508-9. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
179. See id. at 505 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
180. Id.
181. See id.
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Nonetheless, the majority was not going to extend the law of conversion in a
way that "hinder[ed] research by restricting access to the necessary raw materi-
als. ' 182 The characterization of the cells as property depended solely on whose
hands it was in. In effect, the court posited the medical researchers as existing
outside of the market when it warned of the moral perils of commodification of the
body, thus cloaking the researchers' economic interest in the disinterested "objec-
tivity" of science. 183
C. Legal Discourse of the Modem Body
As illustrated by the Moore decision, there are many current debates over
who, if anyone, should be entitled to a property right in the body. Generally, the
analytical framework for these arguments finds its origin in the conception of the
body found in "legal liberalism." 184 Legal liberalism is the traditional American
approach to defining relationships between the government, the market, and the
rights-bearing subject. Liberty is viewed in its negative terms such as the right to
do certain things without interference provided that no one else's right to negative
liberty is infringed in the process. 185 Our constitutionally based conception of the
rights-bearing subject, then, is one of abstract individualism: the unique self as
separate from the masses. 186 Inevitably, however, tension arises when there is
controversy over such things as declarations of property rights because individual-
ity must be reconciled with majoritarian democracy. 187 In these circumstances,
the law must determine which policy prevails, individual rights or the overall soci-
etal interest.
Reconciling the tension between democracy and individual rights is most sig-
nificant in reference to the body of the rights-bearing subject. Autonomy, habeas
corpus, rights to privacy, and rights to property, all refer to ways in which the law
"intersects" with the body.188 The body, then, becomes a necessary shield in pro-
tecting the dignity of "personhood" from tortious, governmental, or market inva-
sion.189 Essentially, this Cartesian conception of the body as a sort of corporeal
boundary was the philosophical framework of the Moore majority when it held
that Moore could not be allowed to profit from his own body.
In determining who should be entitled to property rights in the body, legal
liberalism tends to be divided into two camps: those who believe that the rights-
182. Id. at 495.
183. For further discussion regarding the need for the law to catch up with the advances of
scientific and medical research, see generally Michael MJ. Lin. Conferring A Federal Property
Right in Genetic Material: Stepping Into The Future ith The Genetic Privacy Act, 22 AM. J..
& Med., 109 (1996) (discussing, in part, how we need to identify the economic interests of
medical researchers and research institutions).
184. See Halewood, supra note 4, at 1346.
185. See id. at 1335-36.
186. See Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries and the Bounded Self, in A PRorrY AtmoL-
oGY 28, 30 (Richard H. Chused ed., 1993) ("The boundaries central to American constitutional-
ism are those necessary to protect a bounded or 'separative self...'").
187. See id. at 29.
188. See Halewood, supra note 4, at 1336.
189. See id.
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bearing subject should have an unrestricted, alienable property right in their own
bodies, 19 0 and those who believe that either the body is too sacred to be viewed as
property, or that a property interest in the body should be market-inalienable. 19 1
The first approach argues that individuals should have the choice and the free-
dom to contract property rights in their own bodies. This interpretation of nega-
tive liberty is politically based in a laissez-faire approach to freedom. Everything
is a commodity and therefore subject to consensual market exchange where all
parties benefit. It follows that people should be able to exercise their property
rights in their own bodies. 192 The opposing school of thought within legal
liberalism's framework brings to light the tension between individual rights and
the priority of overall social good. These proponents argue that there should be
either no property right in the body, or a property right that is market-inalienable
because bodily integrity is essential to human dignity.193 This view criticizes the
190. See, e.g., Brian G. Hanneman, Comment, Body Parts and Property Rights: A New Com-
modity for the 1990's, 22 Sw. U.L. REv. 399, 419 (arguing for a fully market-alienable property
right in the body); Rhonda 3. Hartman, Beyond Moore: Issues of Law and Policy Impacting
Human Cell and Genetic Research in the Age of Biotechnology, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 463, 472
(1993) (arguing that an individual, market-alienable property right could be recognized in
replenishable body parts such as cells, without threatening human dignity); Hannah Horsely,
Reconsidering Inalienability for Commercially Valuable Biological Materials, 29 HA,,. J. ON
LEGis. 223, 224 (1992) (arguing that there should be a market-alienable property right in certain
types of biological tissues); William Boulier, Comment, Sperm, Spleens, and other Valuables:
The Need to Recognize Property Rights in Human Body Parts, 23 Horsi'A L. REv. 693, 694-95
(1995) (arguing that recognizing a property right in the body will allow the legal system to
handle demand for body parts and allow individuals to gain better control over their bodies);
Roy Hardiman, Comment, Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing Property Rights in
the Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REv. 207,212 (1986) (arguing for a limited
"commerciality" right in the body); Phillipe Ducor, The Legal Status of Human Materials, 44
DRAKE L. Rev. 195, 259 (1996) (arguing that full property rights should be given to human
"objects" with limitations applying only when a "complete vesting threatens human dignity").
191. See, Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Hxv. L. Rev. 1849, 1909 (1987)
(arguing that property that is integral to personhood, such as the body, should be market-inalien-
able); Michelle Bourianoff Bray, Comment, Personalizing Personality: Toward a Property Right
in Human Bodies, 69 TEx. L. REv. 209, 239 (arguing that an individual should have a market-
inalienable property right in the body to protect human dignity); Michael D. Rivard, Toward A
General Theory of Constitutional Personhood: A Theory of Constitutional Personhood For
Transgenic Humanoid Species, 39 UCLA L. REv., 1425, 1500 (1992)(arguing the need to recog-
nize personhood in the body to maintain human dignity).
192. Some commentators have even gone so far as to suggest that the proper legislation could
yield a futures market in body parts, whereby one could sell the rights to their body parts to be
used after death. See Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues
of a Futures Market, 58 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 1 (1989). See also Brian G. Hanneman, Com-
ment, Body Parts and Property Rights: A New Commodity for the 1990's, 22 Sw. UL. Rev. 399,
420-27 (1993). Hanneman argues that the most significant benefit to this plan would be the end
of "judgment-proof' defendants. The successful plaintiff would simply be able to put a lien on
the defendant's "only asset," his body:
At this point the defendant has a choice. The defendant can either continue to live
with abandon and disregard the lien against his or her body, or the defendant can seek
to discharge the lien by satisfying the judgment.... This method has the additional
benefit of encouraging plaintiffs to seek redress for their wrongs; thus, it discourages
harmful conduct.
Id. at 428. Hanneman justified the practice as follows: "[Blecause the current system already
exploits the poor, no proposed solution could be worse." Id. at 425 (footnote omitted).
193. See Halewood, supra note 4, at 1336.
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laissez-faire approach for not taking into account the unequal bargaining positions
of the market actors. "Free exchange," in this view, is a fallacy of market rhetoric
that would lead those in financial desperation to sell off parts of their bodies to the
wealthy. In attempting to reconcile the tension between the rights-bearing subject
and the masses, this perspective often recognizes the need for a property interest in
the body only for the sake of maintaining individual dignity, and asserts that this
interest must be regulated as to protect the dignity of society as a whole.194
Ironically, however, this "de-commodification" argument unintentionally but-
tresses its more conservative counter-part in the way it conceptualizes the body.
Both positions are rooted in legal liberalism's philosophical foundation wherein
the human subject is defined as being comprised of a dichotomy of subject and
object. In other words, "personhood" (the "free will" and "essence" of an indi-
vidual human being) 195 is distinct from and superior to the sheer materiality of the
body. However, both positions do value the body in its necessary capacity of
protecting the integrity of this "personhood." Essentially, then, the role of the
body is to serve as a sort of "physical boundary that protects the rights-bearing
subject."196
In order to maintain this conceptual dichotomy of mind and body, legal liber-
alism must necessarily begin with the assumption that there is a universal human
"essence" that transcends cultural subject positions of race, class, and gender. "[To
make formal equality of persons possible, liberalism defines persons in their most
bare form, stripped of all particularity so that each possesses a similar moral
weight." 197 This essentialist premise tends to oversimplify. Universalizing hu-
man "will" removes it from all cultural contexts by assuming that we all share a
common human "essence" despite our external material, social, historical, and
cultural circumstances. 19 8 The problem with these abstract nomenclatures called
"will" or "essence" is that they gain legitimacy solely through the experience of
the person who is speaking. This essentializing of human identity further assumes
that the mere "boundary" of the body serves only to protect the dignity of the
universal rights-bearing subject.199 As a result, there is no physical embodiment
to the conception of "personhood," but instead the canonical "will" of a dominant
social consciousness to which all must conform lest they be marked as "other."200
Peter Halewood offers a particularly persuasive pragmatic critique of the way
the "boundary" metaphor of the body works within legal liberalism's mind/body
dichotomy.2 01 By combining a number of postmodern theories2 02 he demon-
194. For further analysis of the de-commodification view, see Appadurai, supra note 4, at 23.
195. See Halewood, supra note 4, at 1336 ("[Lliberal rights theory separates itself from the
body, basing its universalism on the equality with which it attaches to all legal subjects as ab-
stract wills or personalities...").
196. See id. 1335-36.
197. 1l at 1340.
198. See hi. at 1340.
199. Yet this boundary conception of the body can also be ambiguous: "The legal body
preserves [a] tricky relationship towards difference by being able to present itself alternatively
as the site of human sameness and of human differentiation." Hvva, supra note 70, at 260.
200. See Halewood, supra note 4, at 1344.
201. See generally id.
202. Broadly defined, postmodernism, (also sometimes referred to as "postructuralism")
looks to the "contingency and constructedness of social practices, cultures, discourses, and in-
stitutions (for example, the body, truth, and law) and the present fragmentation of cherished,
modernist understandings of these categories." It. at 1333 n.4. This method of analysis
contextualizes its object of study, and recognizes that the "situatedness" of certain groups is
"essential to philosophical perspective and, ultimately, to productive theories of justice." Id.
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strates the "contingency" of our conception of the body as an "organic whole. ' 2 03
He argues that legal liberalism's "boundary" metaphor effectively reduces the body
to the status of "surplus" to human "essence."'204 Thus, heirarchalizing abstract
"will" "disembodies" the individual, moving the material body into the realm of
objects, and leaving it open to commodification.205 By subordinating the body to
the status of a "surplus" object, legal liberalism conceptually erases the body's
significance to "personhood.' '206
Halewood's critique is persuasive because it offers an alternative way of look-
ing at the body that is based upon our existing cultural practices. Halewood argues
that valuing the body as simply the boundary that protects "identity," instead of
viewing bodies as constructed by political discursive formations, 207 effectively
erases the political "situatedness" of those groups on the cultural fringe whose
value has been defined by their bodies. Examples include wage labor, pornogra-
phy, fashion advertising, prostitution, adoption "baby markets," and fertility clin-
ics selling "customized" embryos to those who can afford it.20 8
If, instead, one looks at the political constructs of the body (i.e., where par-
ticular bodies are materially situated in our culture and the values we place on
them) the question is no longer whether "the body" is or should be commodified,
but rather which bodies are already commodified, and who is allowed to benefit
from this commodification. 2 09 Notably, the current objects of commodification
203. Id. at 1337.
204. See id. See also HYDe, supra note 70, at 260.
205. See Halewood, supra note 4, at 1337.
206. See id. at 1337-38 (summarizing Foucault's theory of the liberal body).
207. See HYDE, supra note 70, at 6 (1997). Hyde writes:
The very ease with which we construct the body as machine, as property, as consumer
commodity, as bearer of privacy rights or of narratives, as inviolable, as sacred, as
object of desire, as threat to society, demonstrates that there is no knowledge of the
body apart from our discursive constructions of it.
I& Therefore, "[tlhe body is knowable only through the discursive mediation of our metaphors
and visualizations, and these in turn have political content." Id. at 51.
208. See Gina Kolata, Clinics Selling Embryos Madefor 'Adoption': Couples Can Even Pick
Ancestry for $2,750," N.Y. ToiS, Nov. 23, 1997, at Al. When asked whether customizing
embryos violated ethical considerations, the doctor/researcher responded, "Behind closed doors,
the most liberal-minded people are about as discriminating as you can get. So don't accuse us of
playing God." Id.
See also Patricia Williams, Spare Parts, Family Values, Old Children, Cheap, 28 New ENo. L.
Rev. 913, 918 (1994). Law Professor and legal scholar Patricia Williams describes her experi-
ence of adopting a baby through a private adoption agency. Williams wrote that she had no
problem with the practice that prospective parents paid a certain standardized fee a certain per-
centage of which would pay for administrative, counseling, and hospital costs for the birth mother.
This was described to her as the "Standard Price List." However, the agency also offered her a
"special." She describes the conversation:
"And the special?" I asked. After an embarrassed pause, I was told that that referred
to "older, black, and other handicapped children" and that those fees were exactly
half of those on the standard scale. Suddenly, what had been a price system based on
services rendered became clearly, sickeningly, irretrievably, a price system for "goods,"
a sale for chattel, linked not to services but to the imagined quality of the "things"
exchanged.... It had all the earmarks ea two-for-one sale.... [T]he acquisition of
another for a sum considered as either a "deal" or a "steal," if not outright slavery,
resembles nothing less than bounty hunting.
ld. at 918-19.
209. See HYDE, supra note 70, at 5.
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are the bodies of those on the "fringe" of dominant culture: lower economic classes,
women, and children removed from the family sphere. Speaking of the "surplus"
material body in abstract terms ignores society's discursive practice of producing
identity through conceptions of the body, instead of "protecting" it: "Law's con-
struction of the body is not transparently a construction. It is often naturalized, so
that speakers experience themselves as reporting facts about race, sex, suffering,
value, boundaries, and social meaning of the body as if these features inhered in
physical bodies instead of being constructed discursively." 2 10
What we are left with is a central conception of "personhood" naturalized as
the disembodied "will" or "essence" of those whose cultural identities are defined
in opposition to commodified bodies on the cultural fringe:
The heretical body defines the will as canonical. This model impacts various
groups differently, given the gendered and racialized identification of women
and people of color with mere bodies and white men with pure wills. The erasure
of the body in legal liberalism thus ensures the erasure of the female and racially
'other' subject, while the white, male autonomous 'universal' will, defined in
opposition to the particularity of these 'other' subjugated bodies, finds full ex-
pression and recognition in legal discourse. 2 11
Thus, it is through the conception of the corporeal boundary of bodily integrity
that law-makers insist they are protecting the "personhood" of all citizens from the
dehumanizing effects of commodification. Yet, ironically, our current practice of
commodifying particular "othered" bodies (i.e., those bodies located at the cul-
tural fringe) necessarily depends upon an ideological construction of"personhood"
that defines "essence" by its opposition to those bodies it commodifies. 212
It is important to note that the body-as-boundary paradigm has always posited
itself at the intersection of the law, the market, and the individual. However, the
law has yet to assimilate science and medicine into this already problematic para-
digm because, unlike discourses of law and culture, which perpetually debate mean-
ing and value, science and medicine have always signified to the lay person "ob-
jective" truth.2 13 As a result, science and medicine have long enjoyed economic
"rights" in the modem body with little to no interference. By conceptually remov-
ing science and medicine from the sphere of market culture, law and culture effec-
tively have been subordinated to the interests of science and medicine.
210. Id. at 261. Moreover, to erase the significance of the body not only erases the situatedness
of those on the fringe, but erases their identities as well by perpetuating the conception of their
bodies-within which we have imagined their value-as objects of the market. "The body,"
then, as surplus to "real personhood" posits the fringe as "surplus" as well. It marginalizes their
"otherness" as separate from the universal conception of "personhood.' See generally id. at 6-
9.
211. Halewood, supra note 4, at 1378 (summarizing Foucault's theory of discourse and the
body).
212. For further discussion with respect to the nature of conceptual dichotomies that legiti-
mate those at the center of dominant culture by contrasting them to the bodies at the fringe, see
Donna J. Haraway, StUANs, CYBORGS, AND Wo.imN, THE RENvwEmNON OF NA-uRE 177 (1991).
213. See JAsANOFF, supra note 96, at 113. Jasanoff writes:
[S]cience still holds its place as a separate power, whose claims need not be
deconstructed with the same skeptical intensity as the motivations of the legislators
and interest groups who challenge its cognitive authority.... [lI]t seems that on the
plane of ideology science has little to fear from the courts.
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Moreover, because the dominant analytical paradigm of legal liberalism does
not provide an adequate analysis for examining commodification of the body in
our culture, it is left with no vocabulary to analyze the effects of biotechnological
advances. Biotechnology complicates legal liberalism's concept of human "es-
sence" in the mind/body dichotomy by suggesting new ways in which to conceptu-
alize the rights-bearing subject. Cloning research and the Human Genome
Project2 14 suggest that the boundary that protects the "will" can be more than
broken down-it can be fragmented and reassembled differently.2 15 In this sense,
biotechnology does violence to the cherished body-as-boundary image suggesting
"that even the [boundary of the] body is not a fixed, natural, and organic entity."'2 16
In our commodified culture, biotechnology poses an ambiguous threat: "[It]
suggests that a future normative reconstruction of personhood is possible-a re-
construction not tied to liberal property and contract models of private right and
market exchange."'2 17 The "boundary" of the rights-bearing subject, then, is no
longer certain: "[I]t is no longer clear exactly what or where the body is in scien-
tific, legal or cultural terms."'2 18
IV. THE LEGAL BODY IN BIOTECHNOLOGY
A. The Shiftfrom the Modem to the Postmodern Condition
The shift away from the modem era of monopolies and organic industrial
commodities to the more recent postmodern era2 19 of intangible commodities of
information (such as genetic patenting, and the Internet) reconfigures and under-
214. In the 1980s the Human Genome Project was designed to isolate particular genes to
study their connection to birth defects, disease, and so on. There are several techniques cm-
ployed in this research such as a "knock out" technique whereby scientists remove a gene from
an embryo during its early stages to see how it affects the animal as it grows. If the animal
develops a condition or disease, it may be indicative of a correlation between the gene and the
condition or disease. See Laura Van Dam, The Gene Doctor Is In, 100 TECH. Rav. 46 (1997).
A newer, more controversial technique is involved in "knock in" technology. In this proce-
dure, a gene from an animal embryo is exchanged with a human gene. This allows investigators
to develop specific mutations that offer significant breakthroughs in deadly diseases. For in-
stance, exchanging the hemoglobin gene that causes sickle-cell anemia from human to mouse
would allow researchers to experiment with treatments on the animal that may eventually be
safe to use on humans. See id.
215. See Halewood, supra note 4, at 1337.
216. Id. at 1387.
217. Id.
218. 1& at 1349.
219. Although any precise definition of an historical or cultural shift risks gross reductiveness,
modernism generally signifies a particular historical break from traditional early nineteenth cen-
tury romantic ideals to a more pessimistic view of society as having devolved into urban decay.
Societal fragmentation and alienation of the individual are common themes during this period.
Thus, modernism was a period marked with yearning for escape to a more pastoral, romantic
era. See JERimy HAwmoP.N, A CoNcisE GLOSSARY OF CONTmPoRARY LrrERARY THEORY 119-124
(2d. ed. 1994).
Although marked with the same themes of societal fragmentation and alienation, the
postmodern condition suggests not only an acceptance of and fascination with technology, but
also a growing multinationalism given the new wide-reaching capabilities of information sys-
tems. See id.
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mines what we have long thought of as "natural" about our society and the rights-
bearing subject 2 2 0 In the postmodem era, the central imagery of industrialization
is replaced by cyberspace, a universal system of information. Leading critic Donna
Haraway writes:
[There are] claims about the fundamental changes in the nature of class, race, and
gender in an emerging system of world order analogous in its novelty and scope
to that created by industrial capitalism; we are living through a movement from
an organic, industrial society to a polymorphous, information system-from all
work to all play, a deadly game. Simultaneously material and ideological ....
[the] transitions from the comfortable old hierarchical dominations to the scary
new networks I have called informatics of domination.2 21
Many argue that this transition into postmodern condition is increasingly strip-
ping away our "humanity."22 2 For example, many have criticized the effect of
computers on human interaction. While the Internet offers communication around
the globe, its method of interaction is faceless and impersonal, making the com-
puter the intermediary in human relations. Personality is reduced to bits of infor-
mation sent through the modem. In cyberspace, one human being is indistinguish-
able from another. Thus, these critics argue, technological advances in the
postmodern world are slowly replacing humans with machines in the home, the
workplace, and society.22 3
It is worth noting, however, that conceptually identical arguments were made
with the rise of industrial capitalism and the development of sophisticated ma-
chines.224 Yet the cultural hierarchies and class systems that were so highly criti-
cized in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have now become famil-
iar and seemingly self-evident. Over the course of the century, American society
has naturalized this industrial/capitalist tradition. As a result, the current cultural
authorities in American society appear to have been there all along. This compari-
son suggests that the conceptual shift that now accompanies postmodernism, in
part, gives rise to anxieties concerning new cultural authorities and power and the
democracy of knowledge.2 25
220. See HAtRwAY, supra note 212, at 161-62.
221. Id. at 161. Haraway also offers a number of interesting dichotomies that illustrate the
conceptual shifts from Modernity to Postmodernity: Representation/Simulation; Realism/Sci-
ence fiction; Organism/Biotic component; PerfectioalOptimization; Organic division of labor/
Ergonomics, cybernetics of labor, Labor/Robotics; Mind/Artificial intelligence; Sex/Genetic
engineering; Reproduction/Replication. See id. at 161-62.
222. See Robert B. Pippin, On the Notion of Technology as Ideology, in TEchmoLOGY AmD mmE
PoLrrcs oF KNowLmG- 43, 44-45 (Andrew Feenberg and Alastair Hannay eds., Indiana Univer-
sity Press 1995) (discussing public reaction charging that the "'technological tail' [is] beginning
to wag the 'human dog"). For further discussion of the impact of the information age on legal
construction of property rights, see generally JAt.ms BotF, Sttm, t.is, SoFTWARE, & Sn.xsEs:
LAw A m CoNsmtcRUoN oFrMM INoFr A -oN SocM-y (1996).
223. See Pippin, supra note 222, at 44-45.
224. See discussion supra Section II.C.
225. See MARiN Kmimy, BIOaincNoLoGr. THE UNIvERsrTY-INusinuu CoMEnx 31 (1986);
see also Pippin, supra note 222, at 44. Pippin states:
With the growing sophistication of science and technology, and the difficulties en-
countered by a lay public in understanding evidence, demonstrations, and the ambi-
guities and risks inherent in the pursuit of any end, such elites grow progressively less
accountable in traditional ways for the exercise of their power, shielded as they are by
the claim to greater technological competence.
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Haraway argues quite persuasively that shaking up the very settled ideas of
what counts as "natural" and what does not is not necessarily a bad thing.2 26 This
conceptual shift in our market and culture into the postmodern condition suggests
that our most cherished meanings are up for grabs: "Communications sciences
and biology are constructions of natural-technical objects of knowledge in which
the difference between machine and organism is thoroughly blurred; mind, body,
and tool are on very intimate terms."'227 Just as scientific knowledge and dis-
course were "naturalized" in early modem aesthetics and economics, 2 28 they are
now further imbedded in the discourse of the technologically postmodem world.
What is needed, then, is not resistance to scientific technology per se, but closer
scrutiny into the kinds of meaning it produces and the powers that underlie it:
"Technologies and scientific discourses can be partially understood as fornaliza-
tions, i.e., as frozen moments, of the fluid social interactions constituting them, but
they should also be viewed as instruments of enforcing meanings. '229
As the history of our capitalist tradition has shown, ethical debates concerning
"progress" are inevitably intertwined with its commodifying effects. In other words,
the abstract "dehumanizing" images of the "unique" individual attributed to the
current "progress" of science and biotechnology are, in large part, a more subver-
sive discourse concerning the business of science and medicine. This discourse
reflects our resistance to science and medicine's commodifying effect on our cul-
ture. Yet while the scientific and medical industries continue to profit from the
human body, our culture's tendency to naturalize the origins of scientific and medical
institutions inevitably naturalizes the industries' economic practices as well.2 30
Consequently, scientific and medical commodification of the body has thus far
escaped any concrete and pragmatic analysis.
B. The Legal Reaction to Biotechnology
Unlike the legal deference shown science and medicine in other areas such as
organ donation and traditional medical research,2 3 1 current biotechnological ad-
vances, such as cloning and the research conducted in the Human Genome
Project,232 have given rise to sweeping adverse reactions among legal policy-mak-
ers.23 3 In the context of controversial biotechnological advances, the venerated
226. See HARAWAY, supra note 212, at 181.
227. id. at 165.
228. See discussion supra Section II.C-E.
229. HARtAWAY, supra note 212, at 164.
230. See generally KENNEY, supra note 225, at 28-32.
231. See discussion supra Section III.A.
232. See supra note 214.
233. See William Neikirk, No U.S. Funds For Human Cloning: Clinton Also Asks Private-
Sector Labs to Shelve Research, CHI. Tans., Mar. 5, 1997, at 3; Katherine Q. Seelye, G.O.P.
Lawmaker Proposes Bill To Ban Human Cloning, N.Y. TuMEs, Mar. 6, 1997, at B12; Sharon
Schmickle, House Panel Debates Ethics of Cloning, STAR TIB. (Minneapolis), Mar. 6, 1997, at
8A; Lisa Zagaroli, Ban Cloning Funding, Research, Ehlers Says, DEr. Naws, Mar. 6, 1997, at
A5; Gina Kolata, Ethics Panel Calls For Laws To Ban Cloning of Humans; 'Morally Unaccept-
able, 'Clinton Told, Aiz. REPUBLIC, June 8, 1997, at A17; Richard Nicholson, 7Wo of a Kind-or
None?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 1997 at 5; Beth Baker, To Clone or Not To Clone-
Congress Poses the Question, BioScmNcE, June 1997 at 340; Clinton Seeks To Ban Human Cloning
But NotAll Experiments, N.Y. TimES, June 10, 1997, at C4; Joyce Howard Price, Clinton Attacks
Human Cloning, WASH. TDAEs, Jan. 11, 1998, at Al, available in 1998 WL 3436898; Edwin
Chen, Clinton Urges Quick Ban on Human Cloning, Los ANGELES TimEs, Jan. 11, 1998, at A 1,
available in 1998 WL 2387817; Tim Friend, The Sky's the Limit on Scientific Findings: Spitting
Image Cloned Dolly Holds Promise for the Future, USA TODAY, Dec. 30, 1997, at 4D.
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medical researcher, referred to by the Moore majority as the "innocent" party who
furthers the social good,234 now reemerges in his vilified form-the medical re-
searcher of science fiction.
Biotechnological advances seem to produce two significant anxieties for both
the public as well as law-makers. First, their capacity to "replicate" and "reas-
semble" the body does violence to the body-as-boundary conception of the rights-
bearing subject. 2 35 Second, these scientific advances give rise to the perception
that biotechnology reaches far beyond those particular bodies that our society al-
ready commodifies because, unlike culture and the market, science recognizes no
class, gender, or racial boundaries. The economic interests of both medical re-
searchers, and the biotechnology companies that fund their experiments, place all
bodies open to commodification, not just those bodies that hdve been culturally
marginalized in the past. It seems, therefore, that no body is beyond the reach of
biotechnology.
This perceived threat is due in large part to the fact that we intuitively natural-
ize the "objective" authority of science and medicine as something outside of our
understanding and control. To view biotechnology in the postmodern age as an
inevitable, incalculable threat to "humanity" ignores the fact that science and medi-
cine are concrete professional and economic institutions which should be subject
to the same laws and regulations as other professions and individuals. When sci-
ence and medicine are removed from the realm of the market, their commodifying
effects on the human body are subverted. As a result, the sweeping adverse reac-
tion to its "overreaching" potential exempts science and medicine from concrete
and pragmatic scrutiny of its economic practices.
The scientific breakthroughs in cloning techniques-both performed by
Scotland's Roslin Institute and promised by the recent "media villain," Dr. Rich-
ard Seed-have given rise to a public frenzy and negative mass-media images. 236
234. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d at 493.
235. See HARAWAY, supra note 212, at 177. Haraway writes: "High-tech culture challenges
these [the mind/body] dualisms in intriguing ways. It is not clear who makes and who is made in
the relation between human and machine. It is not clear what is mind and what body in ma-
chines that resolve into coding practices." Id. See also, Halewood, supra note 4, at 1387.
236. The following are just a handful of media stories surrounding the cloning debate: Rob-
ertReno, Clone Foes: New Witch Hunters, NEwsDAY, Mar. 16, 1997, atF08; Charles Krauthammer,
Of Headless Mice... and Men, The Ultimate Cloning Horror: Human Organ Farms, Tam, Jan.
19, 1998, at 76; Peter Steinfels, All Kidding Aside: The Issue of Human Cloning Draws Reaction
that Ranges from the Bitter and Belittling to the Solemn and Even Wistful, N.Y. Tms, July 12,
1997, at A9; Diane Carman, The Human Cloning Race Will Be Won, But By Whom?, Dev. Posr,
Jan. 10, 1998, available in 1998 WL 6098652; Tom Brazaitis, Amid the Cloning Debate, We'll
Repeat Ourselves, PLAN DEALER (Cleveland), Mar. 9, 1997, at 3E; Cloning Humans An Idea
That Ought To Be Squelched, 'Copy Centers'For People Should Be Outlawed, PORTAD PRESS
HERxtm, Jan. 10, 1998, at 10A, available in WIL 2480346; Cloning For Cash: Physicist May
Speak of Godlike Ambitions, But It's an Earthly Reward He Craves, PLAtN DEALER (Cleveland).
Jan. 10, 1998, at 10B, available in 1998 WL4114420; Richard Dawkins, Thinking ClearlyAbout
Clones: How Dogma and Ignorance Get in the Way, FREE INQitmv, Summer 1997, at 13;A Mere
Ban Isn't Enough: Making Public Policy on Cloning, SvA~cusE HERA J., Jan. 10, 1998, at A5,
available in 1998 WL 4332348; Charles Marwick, Put Human Cloning on Hold, Say Bioethi-
cists, JAMA, July 2, 1997, at 13; Harold T. Shapiro, Ethical and Policy Issues of Human Clon-
ing, ScmEc., July 11, 1997, at 195.
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Here we see that what began as a virtual paralysis among legal policy makers in
response to cloning research 237 has recently turned into panic. 238 Instead of pro-
tecting medical research, lawmakers are now trying to protect themselves from it
by implementing widespread bans and unduly restrictive regulations on poten-
tially beneficial biotechnological research.
C. Congress, Cloning, and the Roslin Institute
The most illustrative example of lawmakers' overreaction to biotechnology
began in March 1997 when Dr. Ian Wilmut of Scotland's Roslin Institute announced
that he had cloned a sheep from the DNA of the mammary cell of an adult sheep.
The DNA from the host sheep had been injected into an unfertilized egg, directed
to divide itself until it grew into an ordinary embryo, and implanted into the womb
of an adult sheep for the remainder of the gestation period. The six-year-old adult
sheep gave birth to her identical twin, whom the researchers named "Dolly."2 39
The Institute later trumped that accomplishment on July 9 of that same year
by cloning "Polly" and "Molly," transgenetic lambs containing a human gene.24 0
Scientists estimate that these transgenetic animals carry vital human proteins in
their blood and breast milk,2 4 1 and may very well lead to the possibility of
"pharming" both medicines and much needed organs for humans.2 42
Although the Roslin Institute denied any plans to clone an actual human be-
ing, the public reaction to Dolly's creation nonetheless took the form of irrational
outrage.2 43 In response to this public outcry, Congress placed a ban on all federal
funding for most types of cloning research, 244 and President Clinton made an ap-
peal to the private sector to refrain from human cloning research until the National
Bioethics Advisory Commission could develop the appropriate guidelines. 24 5 The
Commission recommended that Congress and the President place a ban on all hu-
237. See Sen. Al Gore, Planning a New Biotechnology Policy, 5 HARV. J.L. & TacH. 19,20-21
(1991) (discussing the "lethargy" of legal policy-making in the 1980s with respect to biotechno-
logical advances).
238. See KImNNY, supra note 225.
239. See Tim Friend, The Sky's the Limit on Scientific Findings, Spitting Image Cloned Dolly
Holds Promise for the Future, USA TODAY, Dec. 30, 1997, at 4D.
240. The technique involved replacing the genetic material of a sheep's egg with a combina-
tion of the skin cells of a fetal sheep and a human gene. See Tim Friend, New Sheep Clones May
Help Make Medicine, USA TODAY, Dec. 19, 1997, at ID; Scots Clone a Lamb with Human Gene
On a Pharm, NEWSDAY, July 29, 1997, at B25; Gina Kolata, New Cloned Sheep Born in Scotland
Carry Human Gene, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), July 25, 1997, at 6A.
241. See Tim Friend, The Sky's the Limit on Scientific Findings, Spitting Image Cloned Dolly
Holds Promise for the Future, USA TODAY, Dec. 30, 1997, at 4D.
242. Both "Polly" and "Molly" carry the human gene responsible for blood-clotting Factor
IX-this is missing in humans with Hemophilia B. See Tim Friend, New Sheep Clones May
Help Make Medicine, USA TODAY, Dec. 19, 1997, at ID; Scots Clone A Lamb With Human Gene
OnA Pharm, NEWSDAY, July 29, 1997, at B25; Gina Kolata, New Cloned Sheep Born in Scotland
Carry Human Gene, PLAIN DEA.E (Cleveland), July 25, 1997, at 6A.
243. See supra note 233.
244. See Clinton Seeks to Ban Cloning But Not All Experiments, N.Y. TimEs, June 10, 1997,
at C4.
245. See Sharon Schmickle, House Panel Debates the Ethics of Cloning, STR TRIn., Mar. 6,
1997, at 8A.
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man embryo cloning, with the exception of a few "proper experiments. 246 Sub-
sequently, Clinton submitted for legislation the "Cloning Prohibition Act of 1997"
that would prohibit the cloning of a human being for at least five years, save for the
few exceptions suggested by the Committee.24 7 The legislation was narrowly and
carefully worded so as not to prohibit cloning research altogether. 2 48 Still, if suc-
cessful, it will be the first time that legislation prohibits an entire field of medical
research.249
Because of this cautious approach to the cloning ban, the proposed bill did not
attract any enthusiastic sponsors. 250 Instead, a congressional faction emerged,
headed by Republican Representative Vernon Ehlers from Michigan, demanding a
broader ban on cloning research. Ehlers introduced a bill that would not only ban
all federal funding for research into human cloning, but also make the cloning of a
human being, whether publicly or privately funded, a federal crime subject to a
five thousand dollar fine.25 1 Several state legislatures have since followed suit.25 2
Although supportive of the ban on actual human replication, academics and
biotechnology companies were concerned that the effect of a total ban would be
unduly restrictive.253 Most researchers, and other proponents of more cautious
legislation, were concerned that lawmakers were reacting emotionally and that the
sweeping bans were "inappropriately clothed in religious language." 254 In re-
sponse, Ehlers and his supporters continue to espouse that human cloning is just
plain wrong, even in situations where infertile couples could benefit from the pro-
cedure. 255
246. See Clinton Seeks to Ban Human Cloning But Not All Experiments, N.Y. Ts, ES June 10,
1997, at C4.
247. See Rick Weiss, Clinton Wants Human Cloning Ban But Supports Related Research,
REcoRD, Jan. 11, 1998, at 8. The exceptions within the Act would include copying DNA and
manipulating genes to heal diseases and replace damaged tissues. The Act would also allow the
cloning of a human embryo for research purposes provided that the intent is not to implant the
embryo into a womb to gestate. See Donnette Dunbar, Cloning Stirs Discussion on the Origins
of Life, OAHA WoR.D-Hanum, June 14, 1997, at 57.
248. See Rick Weiss, Clinton Wants Human Cloning Ban But Supports Related Research,
REcoRD, Jan. 11, 1998, at 8.
249. See Gina Kolata, Ethics Panel Calls For Laws to Ban Cloning of Humans; 'Morally
Unacceptable,' Clinton Told, Au. REPumtc, June 8, 1997, at A17.
250. See Rick Weiss, Clinton Wants Human Cloning Ban But Supports Related Research,
REcoRD, Jan. 11, 1998, at 8.
251. See Sharon Schmickle, House Panel Debates the Ethics of Cloning, STAR Tram., Mar. 6,
1997, at 8A.
252. See Gina Kolata, Ethics Panel Calls for Laws to Ban Cloning of Humans; 'Morally
Unacceptable,' Clinton Told, ARIZ. REPuBlic, June 8, 1997, at A17.
253. See Katherine Q. Seelye, G.O.P Lawmaker Proposes Bill to Ban Human Cloning, N.Y.
Tams, Mar. 6, 1997, at B12.
254. See id. See also Lisa Zagaroli, Ban Cloning Funding, Research, Elders Says, DEr.
NEws, Mar. 6, 1997, atA5, (Ehlers stated: "It is simply wrong to experiment with the creation of
human life in this way.... Creating life in the laboratory, as we might do with human cloning,
is totally in appropriate and so far removed from the process of marriage and parenting that we
must rebel against the very concept."); Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance: Why We
Should Ban the Cloning of Humans, NEw REPuBlic, June 2, 1997. at 17; John F. Kilner, Stop
Cloning Around; In the Flurry of Scientific Boundary Breaking, Let's Remember That Humans
Are Not Sheep, CmUsTAmTv TODAY, Apr. 28, 1997, at 10.
255. See Katherine Q. Seelye, G.O.P Lawmaker Proposes Bill to Ban Human Cloning, N.Y.
TuMEs, Mar. 6, 1997, at B 12.
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Although not a supporter of Ehler's total ban, the Director of the National
Institute for Health, Dr. Harold Varmus, nonetheless suggested that infertile couples
raise a family "the old-fashioned way-by adoption. '2 56 Another doctor charac-
terized an infertile couple's desire to produce a cloned child as indicative of "a real
ego-centered selfishness in our society."'25 7 He also stated that a child needs to be
born from two genetic partners, otherwise the child runs the risk of being subject
to the "psychological and social impact" of having only one parent. 25 8
Notwithstanding the heteronormative assumptions underlying these attempts
to preserve "natural" reproduction,2 59 what is remarkable about these ethical de-
bates was the complete lack of discussion as to why cloning was bad, beyond the
just-plain-wrong analysis. Many have speculated about what constitutional rights,
if any, will be available to the resulting "creatures" of human cloning.2 60 These
reactions simply ignore the fact that an infant, whether its origins are from sexual
or asexual reproduction, will still gestate in a female womb and be born a person
entitled to legal rights. This asexual reproduction would simply produce a younger,
identical twin. 26 1 This point seems to be lost in the outcry; the utter panic among
legal policy-makers has given rise to some bizarre propositions that turn the clon-
ing debate into a science fiction narrative.2 62 Underlying the ambiguities of this
conception is the notion that science is something beyond our comprehension and
beyond our legal control. The researcher appears in his villainous form, the mad
scientist, the sentinel of information. 26 3
256. See id
257. See Donnette Dunbar, Cloning Stirs Discussion on the Origins of Life, OMAHA WORLD-
HERAmD, June 14, 1997, at 57.
258. See id.
259. Examination of the heteronormative assumptions that "natural" reproduction must, by
definition, take place between opposite sexes (lest the offspring itself be "abnormal") is unfortu-
nately beyond the scope of this Comment. However, the overreaction to the potential of asexual,
as opposed to heterosexual, reproduction clearly does violence to the traditional notion of "fam-
ily values." Cloning reproduction inevitably would reshape and redefine the very meaning of
the term "family." Access to creating a "family" would no longer be limited to traditional het-
erosexual couples. It is no stretch to suggest that the visceral adverse reaction to cloning re-
search derives, in no small part, from the threat to heteronormative monopoly on the cultural
meaning of "family."
260. See, e.g., Andrew Kimbrell, Legality Wouldn ' Protect Cloned Children, N.Y. TiMss,
Dec. 12, 1997, at A22.
261. See Charles Marwick, Put Human Cloning on Hold, Say Bioethicists, 278 JAMA 13
(1997). Moreover, the offspring would develop its own unique personality given that its genetic
inheritance is mediated by its physical and cultural environment. See id.
262. See Katherine Q. Seelye, G.O.P Lawmaker Proposes Bill to Ban Human Cloning, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6,1997, at A12. Lawmakers such as Vernon Ehlers insist on illustrating their mis-
placed anxiety. Ehlers asks, "What if in the cloning process you produce someone with two
heads and three arms? Are you simply going to euthanize and dispose of that person?" Id.
* 263. See JASANOEI, supra note 95, at 3. Jasanoff writes, "Genetic engineering, rightly seen as
one of the great scientific breakthroughs of this age, has been etched on the public conscious-
ness as the technique by which some modern Dr. Frankenstein may fatally tamper with the
balance of nature or destroy forever the meaning of human dignity." Id. See also, George J.
Annas, Questing for Grails: Duplicity, Betrayal and Self-Deception in Postmodern Medical
Research, 12 J. CoNm'MP. H ALTH L. & PoL'Y 297, 310 (1996) (arguing the distinction between
clinical medicine and research by illustrating the latter with examples of Nazi practices and
subversive governmental experiments).
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D. The Business of Cloning
Another illustrative example of both lawmakers' visceral reaction to cloning
research and our culture's tendency to separate science and the market arose with
media coverage of Dr. Richard Seed. Unlike the Roslin Institute that promised
only the pursuit of curing human disease, in January, 1998, Seed unabashedly an-
nounced that he intended to clone a human being: "You can't stop human cloning.
It's inevitable.... Once there are a half-dozen happy, healthy, bouncing clones on
TV and a dozen happy parents, people will endorse this enthusiastically."26 4 De-
spite most scientists' view that cloning technology has not sufficiently advanced
enough to enable Seed to carry out his promise, within days of Seed's announce-
ment, President Clinton appealed to Congress to enact an emergency ban on clon-
ing stating that "scientific advancement does not occur in a moral vacuum." 26 5
Congressional leaders proposed to extend this ban to all privately funded projects.26 6
The public reaction to Seed's announcement ranged from skepticism to hor-
ror. The cloning controversy has since hovered in limine as the public and law-
makers decide whether Dr. Seed is legitimate. Those skeptical of his abilities
depict Seed as a megalomaniac interested in getting attention-and investors.2 67
Others characterize Seed as the logical extension of postmodern progress, the sci-
entific visionary who would change history.26 8
What is interesting about these reactions is that both lawmakers and the public
are gauging Seed's legitimacy by categorizing him as either an eccentric and frus-
trated entrepreneur, or a scientific visionary,2 69 relying on the seemingly mutual
exclusivity of these two concepts. Those who view Seed as a "quack" highlight
his debts and failed investments; 270 those who believe in his abilities focus on his
prescient scientific achievements. 27 1 As a medical researcher, Seed's legitimacy,
then, is determined by where he falls within this dichotomy of science and the
market. As a result, Seed has been delegitimated by many not only by his ambi-
tious and grandiose claims, but also because he is perceived as perverting science
to make a buck.27 2
264. Peter Kendall and Ronald Kotulak, Cloning Enthusiast Brings Mad-Scientist Fears to
Life, CHL TRiB., Jan. 11, 1998, atAl.
265. Joyce Howard Price, Clinton Attacks Human Cloning, WASH. Taees, Jan. 11, 1998, at
Al.
266. See id.
267. See Peter Kendall, Physicist with Cloning Scheme Has Failure-Filled Past, BuFALO
NEws, Jan. 11, 1998, atA3; Peter Kendall, Would-be Cloner's Past Filled with Big Dreams, Bad
Investments, DAuAS MORNING Nws, Jan. 11, 1998, at 4A.
268. See Charles Krauthammer, OfHeadless Mice ... AndMen, Tnm, Jan. 19, 1998, at 76; J.
Madeline Nash, Cloning's Kevorkian, Who is This Eccentric Physicist Named Seed Who Wants
to Start a Clinic in Chicago to Clone Humans?, Temm, Jan. 19, 1998, at 58: Seed Clinic: Post-
Dolly Folly, ST. Louis Posr DISPATCH, Jan. 11, 1998 at B2.
269. See Peter Kendall, Would-be Cloner's Past Filled with Big Dreams, Bad Investments,
DALuAS MORNING NEws, Jan. 11, 1998, at 4A; J. Madeline Nash, Cloning's Kevorkian, Who is
This Eccentric Physicist Named Seed Who Wants to Start a Clinic in Chicago to Clone Hu-
mans?, Tai, Jan. 19, 1998, at 58.
270. See Price supra note 265 at A 1.
271. See id.
272. See Peter Kendall, Would-be Cloner's Past Filled with Big Dreams, Bad Investments.
DALLAS MORNwG NEws, Jan. 11, 1998, at 4A; Peter Kendall, Physicist With Cloning Scheme Has
Failure-Filled Past, BuFFAO NEws, Jan. 11, 1998, at A3.
Moreover, for those who deride his claims, it appears significant not only that Seed is an
entrepreneur, but also that he is a failed entrepreneur. Eroding his legitimacy, then, requires
placing him not only at the fringe of "real" science, but at the fringe of the market as well.
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The public's focus on Seed's economic motives suggests our culture's uneasi-
ness with the notion "medical entrepreneur." Nevertheless, the creation of di-
chotomies in our culture posits science and the market as completely independent
of one another and, as a result, ignores the historically pervasive entrepreneurial
practices of science and medicine as institutions. By removing scientific "legiti-
macy" from the realm of the market, both lawmakers and the public have ignored
a more productive avenue of examining the commodifying effects of science and
medicine. The inquiry into the economic incentives involved in medical research,
then, should not be the sole determinant of its scientific legitimacy, but rather the
economic incentives involved in medical research should be scrutinized as an inte-
gral part of its historical institutional origins. That is, scrutinizing science and
medicine requires viewing them not as naturalized "pure truths" that have been
"corrupted" by the market, but rather as cultural products of the market itself.273
Science and medicine is, and always has been, a business as well as art.
Ironically, the media has not focused on the economic value of the Roslin
Institute even though its promising cloning research has attracted immense entre-
preneurial interest in its commercial potential. 274 This commercial value prom-
ises to place the Roslin Institute and its investors among the handful of entrepre-
neurial sovereigns in the biotechnology industry. Currently, the Institute relies on
private funding for much of its work, particularly after Dolly's creation when
Scotland's Ministry of Agriculture significantly cut the Institute's state funding
due to the ethical considerations presented in cloning research. 275 Although the
Institute was already receiving 45% of its funding from private contract work, the
cut in state funding threatened to be a significant obstacle to its research.2 76
This financial need led the Institute to seek to expand its private funding be-
yond the thirty-one companies with which it has patent licensing agreements. 277
In particular, the cloning process used to create Dolly has been licensed to PPL
Therapeutics, a biotechnology company specializing in genetically altered ani-
mals. 27 8 PPL is the major investor in the Institute's research and is now referred to
as the "Dolly Company."27 9 PPL currently has the greatest stake in Roslin's re-
cent patent infringement battle with Advanced Cell Technology (ACT), a U.S.
rival company, to determine who owns specific cloning methods.2 80 The Massa-
273. See generally, STARR, supra note 2, at 23-24 ; KE.NNEY, supra note 225, at 31. See also
discussion supra Section II.C-E and accompanying notes.
274. See generally Rob Stokes, Roslin in Talks with U.S. Firm Over Anti-Ageing Drugs,
SCoTLAND ON SUNDAY, June 15, 1997, at 2; Claire Smith, U.S. Cloning Experts toAttend Edinburgh
Meeting, SCOTSMAN, May 5, 1997, at 6.
275. See Rob Stokes, Success Won't Pay Bills at Roslin Institute, SCOTLAND ON SUNDAY, June
1, 1997, at 1.
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. See id. Although the institute has no stake in PPL, it owns a significant minority block
in two spin-offs from the institute, the Rosgen company and Roslin Nutrition. See id. Both are
limited companies and are listed as charitable organizations. See id. The director of Roslin
Institute claims that he will continue to create more Institute-owned companies only as a "last
resort" if licensing agreements with other biotechnology companies fail to provide the adequate
research funding. See id.
279. See Rob Stokes, Rival Cloner's Threat to Fleece Dolly, SCOTSMAN, Oct. 12, 1997, at 1.
280. See id.
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chusetts-based company recently filed a patent application claiming significantly
different methods for the cloning process. 28 1 ACT has also joined forces with the
Genzyme, the worldwide leading company in transgenetics.
Given the absence of adequate government funding for scientific and medical
research, it is no exaggeration to say that biotechnology corporations are the driv-
ing influence on scientific and medical research. As a result, the greater interest
underlying the "progress' of science and medicine is not public, but corporate.2 83
Given these corporate underpinnings, it is strange that on the whole the "ethical"
cloning debates highlighted by lawmakers and the American media do not signifi-
cantly include these battles over property rights in cloning research and the grow-
ing economic interests of the biotech industry. This omission of corporate inter-
ests is especially puzzling considering the rapid expansion of the biotechnology
industry over the last twenty years.
In 1975, Genentech, the first biotech firm to develop and market recombinant
DNA, set the stage for a wave of biotech entrepreneurialism. 284 Shortly thereaf-
ter, the Supreme Court's decision in Diamond v.Chakrabarty285 further resolved,
in favor of the scientist inventor, the question of whether our society would allow
inventors to profit from the patenting of living organisms. 28 6 It is no surprise that
after the Chakrabarty decision, Genentech stock prices skyrocketed during its ini-
tial public offering from thirty-five to eighty-nine dollars in twenty minutes.
As one commentator states, "[Tihis was the selling of the tree of knowledge to
Wall Street. A host of new companies were soon formed and began to set records
in gathering venture capital and investments: all this fueled by the newly estab-
lished value of genetic information as manipulated through genetic engineering."2 88
It is also no surprise that in 1990, the year of the Moore decision, biotechnology
stocks were the only sure thing in an otherwise pessimistic year for Wall Street.2 89
The Moore decision "put the pot of gold back at the end of the biotechnology
rainbow by protecting the research community's right to profit from the isolation
and identification of human biological materials."2 90
E. Discourse of the Body in the Biotech Industry
Despite the wave of scientific entrepreneurialism, the activities of the bio-
technology industry have not been seriously implicated in the ethical debates sur-
rounding biotechnological advances. The primary ethical objection to cloning re-
search appears to be that scientific advances simply have gone beyond the limits of
281. See id.
282. See id.
283. See KENN, supra note 225, at 196-203.
284. See Sen. Al Gore, Planning a New Biotechnology Policy, 5 HAtv. J.L & TECH. 19.21-22
(1991).
285. 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (holding live organisms were not outside the scope of patentable
inventions).
286. See id. at 308-10.
287. See Gore, supra note 284, at 21.
288. Id. at 22.
289. See id. at 23-24. Furthermore, for a five-month period during 1991, investment in
biotechnology reached a record high. See id. at 24.
290. Id. at 23.
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what we can adequately process as individuals or as a society. Our traditional
beliefs of what counts as "natural" are entirely reconfigured with progressive sci-
entific advances.
As suggested earlier, in the age of biotechnology, legal liberalism's traditional
construction of the rights-bearing subject no longer provides an adequate means of
conceptualizing abstract individualism in American society.2 9 1 Cloning research
does further violence to the body-as-boundary image of the rights-bearing subject
and to the body's role in protecting "personhood." While legal liberalism insists
that the intellectual uniqueness and physical integrity of the individual is com-
prised of an organic whole, cloning research conceptually fragments both
"personhood" and the body in three distinct ways. First, replication of the indi-
vidual "dilutes" the original "essence" of personhood through repetition. The "origi-
nal" subject would be indistinguishable from her cloned "copies." This image
suggests a sort of anxiety of "dispersal." That is, cloning has the potential capacity
to replicate not just a twin, but an infinite number of genetic copies. Although this
particular repetition metaphor is similar to the image used in the early twentieth
century reaction against industrialization, 292 postmodern biotechnology now threat-
ens to produce the fungible human being in its most tangible form-the simulated
Self. The origin and uniqueness of individuality becomes less clear than it was in
traditional notions of human "essence." 2 93
Second, genetic patents in cloning research conceptually fragment personhood
by breaking down the physical body and reducing it to genetic units of informa-
tion. Because physical integrity of the body has no significant bearing on the issue
of genetic patents in cloning research, particularized racial and sexually identifi-
able bodies are no longer the only bodies open to commodification in our culture.
In other words, the bodies of any and all rights-bearing subjects can be the objects
of the intellectual property claims of scientists and their investors.29 4
Third, biotechnology threatens to do more than breakdown, fragment, and
repeat the body; cutting-edge biotechnological advances also provide the means to
reassemble it as well.295 Grafting human genes into the DNA of lambs,2 96 delet-
ing genes to create headless mice, 297 and talk of genetically engineering the "opti-
291. See discussion supra Section III.B and accompanying notes.
292. See HYDE, supra note 70, at 34-35. See also discussion supra Section ll.C-E and accom-
panying notes.
293. For examples of these reactions see Bob Harris, Second Thoughts About Cloning Hu-
mans, HUMANIST, May-June 1997, at 43 ("Once cloning can begin in utero, how will we tell
clones from the originals?"); M.Z. Ribalow, Take Two: Have Movies About Cloning Prepared
Us for the Real Thing?, SciEzcEs, Sept-Oct 1997, at 38 (discussing the individuality of humans
and the distinctness of the clones created).
294. See generally Michael M.J. Lin, Conferring a Federal Property Right in Genetic Mate-
rial: Stepping into the Future with the Genetic Privacy Act, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 109 (1996);
Halewood, supra note 4, at 1349.
295. See Halewood, supra note 4, at 1337.
296. See Tim Fiend, New Sheep Clones May Help Make Medicine, USA TODAY, Dec. 19,
1997, at ID.
297. See Jocelyn Kaiser, Absent Mouse Gene Leads to No-Brainer; Lim] Gene Controls
Head Development in Mice, ScratcE Naws, Apr. 1, 1995 at 197. Researchers developed a pro-
cess that involves replacing Liml cells with a non-functional gene in mice to produce offspring
with no forebrain or mid-brain. Consequently, the mice look normal from tail to shoulders, but
have nothing more for a head than a stump tipped with ears. See id.
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mal" human body through germline engineering,2 98 all suggest that the organic
boundary of the rights-bearing subject is not immutable, irreducible, or even "natu-
ral." In this sense, scientists are capable of creating a new "origin" for the rights-
bearing subject. Whether this capability is viewed as perverting "natural origins"
or simply as providing an alternative means of creating life, biotechnology never-
theless forces us to reconceptualize the body and the rights-bearing subject it pro-
tects.
Within this reconfiguration of the rights-bearing subject, however, science
and the market have been treated as separate spheres of inquiry in our public and
legal discourse despite the fact that the debates surrounding the cloning "night-
mare" give rise to images of the body not unlike the commodity discourses of the
industrial era.299 In the late nineteenth century, the question of what it meant to be
human was inextricably tied to the issue of the entitlement of a few to claim eco-
nomic rights in the bodies of many.3 00 The metaphors surrounding the laborer
were of both a fragmented working body whose value was reduced to the labor of
its body parts, and the "dilution" of individual identities into faceless commodi-
ties.3 0 1 The fear was that one individual was becoming indistinguishable from
another. Sacrifice of human dignity was the cost of the inevitable forces of
"progress."
Similar to this nineteenth-century concept of "progress," current advances in
biotechnology continue to be thought of as something inevitable and beyond our
control. For instance, we argue at great length about the dehumanizing effects of
cloning research and the overreaching potential of science as a whole. Yet, within
these debates there is little to no discussion of what it means for capital investors to
hold property rights in our genetic information. Instead, American culture laments
with abstractions the loss of humanity in the postmodern age. Alternatively, by
recognizing the current emotional responses to scientific advances as, in part, em-
bodying historically inherited commodification anxieties, we can bring to the sur-
face the material and competing interests involved in biotechnological progress.
V. CONCLUSION
We need to rethink the ways in which we determine the benefits and burdens
of scientific and medical knowledge. This involves parsing the media hype and
examining the particular beneficial scientific advances that are being offered. At
the same time, it involves examining law's contribution to medical and scientific
commodification for exactly what it appears to be-a discourse of accommoda-
298. See Gina Kolata, Scientists Brace for Changes in Path of Human Evolution, N.Y. Tmts,
Mar. 21, 1998, at Al. Unlike cloning techniques that simply divide a host cell, germline engi-
neering injects artificial chromosomes into newly fertilized eggs. See id. This means that these
genetic changes would become permanent and could also be passed down from generation to
generation. See id. Scientists have already developed a computer chip containing DNA that can
custom-make an artificial chromosome. See id. These artificial chromosomes have been pat-
ented, and many companies are now bidding for the right to exploit the new technology. See id.
299. See discussion supra Section II.C.
300. See generally, TRAcm'rusaan supra note 69, at 74-77.
301. See discussion supra Section II.C.
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tion. 302 This accommodation occurs when lawmakers naturalize the cultural privi-
lege of science and medicine, and thus intuitively value these institutions over and
above the individuals they were ostensibly designed to serve. "Denaturalizing"
this cultural privilege of science and medicine (both in its venerated and vilified
forms) means recognizing its historically political origins and its current economic
practices, as well as its beneficial impact on society. Without this type of inquiry,
the law will continue to view science and medicine's economic appeal as merely
incidental to both the optimistic view of scientific progress and the more pessimis-
tic view of its effect on "human values."
Admittedly, given the lack of sufficient government funding, it would be na-
ive to assert that life-saving medical research would have come as far as it has
without private funding. Certainly, these privately funded medical advances have
yielded great benefits to our society. However, despite our culture's historical
commitment to fairness, the law has glossed over the economic practices of sci-
ence and medicine. Thus, lawmakers need to provide a more balanced determina-
tion between particular economic interests and the greater societal benefit involved
in scientific and medical advances. In other words, if lawmakers continue to rely
on the premise that scientific and medical knowledge is truly deserving of special
treatment specifically because of its broader societal benefits, then it follows that
these benefits should not be limited to the few who can afford them. Moreover, by
bringing to the surface the commodifying effects of science and medicine, law-
makers can begin to tackle the issue ofjust what makes us uncomfortable about the
scientific and medical entrepreneur. The questions surrounding the ethics of bio-
technological advances can be asked with more intellectual honesty and in more
concrete terms by applying a more pragmatic analysis that includes all of the inter-
ests involved.
For instance, in debates over the ethical implications of cloning research, the
abstract assertion that "science has gone too far" or that "interfering with nature is
just plain wrong" does nothing to reconcile the very real need for medical research
with the equally real resistance to the commodified body. As a result of these
abstract visceral reactions to new biotechnological breakthroughs, lawmakers have
imposed draconian measures such as a ban on an entire field of progressive and
beneficial research. 3 03 A more concrete and material discourse in legal policy-
making that identifies the players (and their interests) in the scientific and medical
industries will demystify much of our fear of "dehumanization" by moving medi-
cal research out of the realm of abstract science fiction and into the realm of prag-
matic cultural and legal analysis.
Melissa M. Perry
302. See Condit, supra note 15, at 211-215 (defining discursive accommodations as the way
we intuitively value particular interests over others).
303. See discussion supra Section IV.B-C.
[Vol. 5 1:1
